Rennold Pender v. S. W. Dowse and Pearl Dowse, his wife, Jay E. Treadway and Marion Mave Treadway, his wife, and A. C. Whittaker : Brief of Appellant by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
2007
Rennold Pender v. S. W. Dowse and Pearl Dowse,
his wife, Jay E. Treadway and Marion Mave
Treadway, his wife, and A. C. Whittaker : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
LaMar Duncan and Franklin Riter; Attorneys for Appellant .
Unknown.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Pender v. Dowse, No. 7949.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 2007).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2/2688
t i i M n w 11 »•. ~ ~ . 
DOCUMENT 
KFU BRIEF, 
45.9 
DOCKET NO. 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
RENNOLD PENDER, 
Plamtiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
S. W. DOWSE and PEARL DOWSE, 
his wife, JAY E. TREADWAY and 
MARION MAVE TREADWAY, 
his wife, and A. C. WHITTAKER, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT, S. W. DOWSE 
LAMAR DUNCAN AND 
FRANKLIN RITER, 
Attorneys for Appellant, 
S. W. DOWSE 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
INDEX OF CASES CITED 
Page 
Adams v. Pratt, 87 Utah 89, 48 Pac. (2) 444 . . _ 20 
Baker v. Kale, 83 Cal. App. (2) 89; 189 Pac. (2) 57 62 
Barquin v. Hall Oil Co., 28 Wyo. 164, 201 Pac. 352, 202 Pac. 
1107 ....62,66 
Batini v. Ivancich, 105 Cal. App. 391, 287 Pac. 523 25 
Bauer v. Hertweck, 175 Cal. 278; 165 Pac. 946 37 
Bechtel v. Weir, 152 Cal. 443, 93 Pac. 75, 15 A.L.R. (N.S.) 549 24 
Beindorf v. Thorpe, 126 Okla. 157, 259 Pac. 242, 55 A.L.R. 1014 65 
Bird v. Kitchens, Ark , 221 S.W. (2d) 795 35 
Bock v. Losekamp, 179 Cal. 674; 179 Pac. 516 38 
Bonner v. Lockhart, 236 Ala. 171, 181 S. 767.... - 36 
Burkett v. Griffiths, 90 Cal. 532, 27 Pac. 527, 13 L.R.A. 707.... 61, 63 
Burton v. Kipp, 30 Mont. 275, 76 Pac. 563 30, 37 
Chausse v. Bank of Garland, 71 Ut. 586, 268 Pac. 781 19,45 
Chesney v. Valley Live Stock Co., 34 Wyo. 378, 244 Pac. 216, 
44 A.L.R. 1255 44 
City of Sanford v. Ashton, 131 Fla. 759, 179 So. 765 36 
Clark v. Fell, 139 Pa. 469, 22 Atl. 649 38 
Coghlan v. City of Boise, 36 Ida. 613, 212 Pac. 867 31 
Coulters v. Meiggs, 58 R.I. 30, 191 Atl. 115.... 37 
Culver v. Scarborough, 73 Cal. App. 441, 238 Pac. 1104 28 
Dahl v. Prince, Ut , 230 Pac. (2) 1328 „ 65 
Davis v. Hearst, 160 Cal. 143, 116 P. 530 69 
Dewey v. Loomis, 113 Kan. 750, 216 Pac. 271 37 
Dickert v. Weise, 2 Ut. 350, 40 Pac. St. Reports, 350 17 
Dickinson-Reed-Randerson Co. v. Markley, 117 Okla. 17, 244 
Pac. 754 37 
Dixon v. Peacock, 30 Okla. 87, 141 Pac. 429 36 
Drinkhouse v. Van Ness, 202 Cal. 359, 260 Pac. 869 ^ ^ 65 
Elliott & Healy v. Wirth, 34 Idaho 797, 198 Pac. 757 37 
Fox v. Curry, 96 Mont. 212, 29 Pac. (2) 663 29 
Frost v. Hanscome, 198 Cal. 500, 246 Pac. 53 59 
Gross v. Simsack, 364 Pa. 337, 72 Atl. (2) 103.... 35, 36 
Gudger v. Manton, 21 Cal. (2) 537, 134 Pac. (2) 217 61,62,63 
Hamilton v. Waters, 93 Cal. App. 866, 210 Pac. (2) 67 36 
Haugan v. Yale Oil Corp., 124 Mont. 1, 217 Pac. (2) 1084. 30 
Haycroft v. Adams, 82 Ut. 347, 24 Pac. (2) 1110 68 
Hill v. Whitfield, 48 N.C. 120.... 55 
H.O.L.C. v. Edwards, 329 Pa. 529, 198 Atl. 123.... 36 
Horkan v. Eason, 10 Ga. App. 236, 73 S.E. 352 36 
Jacobsen v. Wigen, 52 Minn. 6, 53 N.W. 1016 38 
Johnson v. Gerald, 216 Ala. 581, 113 So. 447, 59 A.L.R. 348 65 
Knapp v. Rose, 32 Cal. (2) 530; 197 Pac. (2) 7 27 
Knox v. Noggle, 279 Pa. 302, 196 Atl. (2) 118 36 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
INDEX OF CASES CITED— (Continued) 
Page 
Lawyers Co-op. Pub. Co. v. Bennett, 34 Fla. 302, 16 So. 185 37 
Local Realty Co. v. Lindquist, 96 Ut. 297, 85 Pac. (2) 770 71 
Marr v. Marr, 73 N.J. Eq. 643, 70 Atl. 375 37 
McAlvay v. Consumers Salt Co., 112 Cal. App. 383, 297 Pac. 135 37 
McGuinness v. Hargiss, 56 Wash. 162, 105 Pac. 233 66 
Mclntire v. Chevrolet Motor Co., 115 Cal. App. 187, 1 Pac. (2) 40.. 59 
McLain Land & Investment Co. v. Swofford Bros. Dry Goods, 11 
Okla. 429, 68 Pac. 502 ,... 37, 54 
Mitchell v. Alpha Hardware & Supply Co., 7 Cal. App. (2) 52, 
45 Pac. (2) 442... 27 
Moropoulos v. Fuller Co., 186 Cal. 679, 200 Pac. 601 59 
Morris v. Winans, 30 Cal. App. 575, 159 Pac. 213 24 
Mortimer v. Young, 53 Cal. App. (2) 317, 127 Pac. (2) 950 38 
Mt. Vernon National Bank v. Morse, 128 Ore. 64, 264 Pac. 439 31 
Murphy v. Booth, 36 Ut. 285, 103 Pac. 768 68 
Myers v. Sanders, 7 Dana (Ky.) 507 55 
National Realty Sales Co. v. Ewing, 55 Ut. 438, 186 Pac. 1103 18 
Oliver v. Dougherty, 8 Ariz. 65, 68 Pac. 553 33 
O'Reilley v. McLean, 84 Ut. 551, 37 Pac. (2) 770 45 
Owens v. Owens, 347 Mo. 80, 146 S.W. (2) 569 58 
Pavlovich v. Watts, 46 Cal. App. 103; 115 Pac. (2) 511 37 
People v. Taylor, 36 Cal. 255 68 
Plains Land and Improvement Co. v. Lynch, 38 Mont. 271, 99 
Pac. 847 31 
Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Bohlken, 40 Fed. Supp. 494.... 58 
Rauer v. Hertweck, 175 Cal. 278,165 Pac. 946... 34 
Raymond v. Halborn, 23 Wis. 57 37 
Reed v. Gourley, Tex. C.A , 109 S.W. (2) 242.... 37 
Ross v. Sweeters, 119 Cal. App. 716, 7 Pac. (2) 234 69 
Rugg v. Tolman, 39 Ut. 295, 117 Pac. 54 68 
Sellers v. Johnson, 207 Ga. 644, 63 S.E. (2) 904.... 36,37 
Sheehan v. All Persons, etc., 80 Cal. App. 393, 252 Pac. 337 36 
Sikes v. Beaver, Sup. Ct. Ga , 157 S.E, 467.... 36 
Smith v. Randall, 6 Cal. 47, 2 Pac. St. Rep. 47 23,26,38 
Solomon v. Neubrecht, 300 Mich. 177, 1 N.W. (2) 501 36, 38 
Spencer v. Commercial Company, 36 Wash. 374, 78 Pac. 914...., 66 
St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. Love, 57 Ut. 450, 195 Pac. 305, 
25 A.L.R. 569 65 
St. Paul Trust & Savings Bank v. Olson, 52 N.D. 315, 202 N.W. 
472 37 
Taylor v. Hearst, 107 Cal. 262, 40 Pac. 392.... 69 
Thomas v. Thomas, 44 Mont. 102, 119 Pac. 283 28, 30 
Trabing v. California Navigation Co., 121 Cal. 137, 53 Pac. 644 69 
Tripp v. Bagley, 75 Ut. 42, 282 Pac. 1026 68 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
INDEX OF CASES CITED—(Continued) 
Page 
Victor Investment Co. v. Roerig, 22 Colo. App. 257, 124 Pac. 
349 21,54,57 
Watt v. McGalliard, 67 111. 513, 124 Pac. 349 57 
White v. Adams, 52 Cal. 435, 1 Pac. States Rep. 435 36 
Whitworth v. McKee, 32 Wash. 83; 72 Pac. 1046 32 
Yoder v. Gevens, 179 Va. 229, 18 S.E. (2) 380.... 58 
Young v. Schroeder, 10 Ut. 155, 37 Pac. 252, 161 U.S. 334, 40 
Law. Ed. 721, 16 Sup. Ct. 512 55 
INDEX OF TEXTS CITED 
Page 
A.L.R. Vol. 1, pp. 1442, 1443 40 
A.L.R. Vol. 150, p. 720 65 
AM. JUR.—CONSPIRACY, Vol. 11, Sec. 4, p. 544 59 
AM. JUR.—EXECUTIONS, Vol. 21, Sec. 519, pp. 258-259 16 
AM. JUR.—LIBEL AND SLANDER, Vol. 33, Sec. 350, pp. 314-315.. 61 
AM. JUR.—DAMAGES, Vol. 15, Sec. 142, p. 551.... 65 
AM. JUR.—COSTS, Vol. 14, Sec. 63, p. 38 65 
AM. & ENG. ENC. LAW, Vol, 25, p. 1079 66 
ANN. CAS. 1913B 616 30 
C.J. Vol. 23, pp. 693, 694, Sec. 691 .' 39 
C.J. Vol. 15, Sec. 1, p. 996 59 
C.J.S.—DAMAGES, Vol. 25, Sec. 50, p. 531.... 65 
CYC. Vol. 25, p. 561 66 
FREEMAN ON EXECUTIONS (3d Ed.) Sec. 279 33 
STORY'S EQUITY JURIS, Vol. 1, Sec. 245 35 
UTAH KULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
Rule 69 12 
Rule 69 (b) 12 
Rule 69 (d) 13 
Rule 69 (e) (1) 13 
Rule 69 (e) (3) 14 
Rule 69 (e) (6) 14 
Rule 69 (e) (f) (3) 15 
Rule 69 (f) (5) 15 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
RENNOLD PENDER, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
S. W. DOWSE and PEARL DOWSE, 
Ms wife, JAY E. TREAD WAY and 
MARION MAVE TREADWAY, 
his wife, and A. C. WHITTAKER, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT, S. W. DOWSE 
PRELIMINARY EXPLANATION 
Counsel for Appellant S. W. Dowse (hereinafter 
designated Dowse) sought to adopt the statement of facts 
contained in the brief of Appellant A. C. Whittaker here-
tofore filed in this Court and cause. The Whittaker brief, 
however, treats of only one facet of this litigation and for 
this reason counsel for Dowse find it necessary to make 
a more elaborate statement of the facts in order to pre-
sent their client's cause in an adequate manner. This 
1 
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apology is made because counsel realize the necessity 
of conserving the time and energies of the Court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Dowse appeals from a judgment of the District 
Court of the Third Judicial District of the State of Utah 
in and for Salt Lake County made, entered and filed on 
November 22, 1952, in favor of Plaintiff and Respondent 
Pender and against Defendant and Appellant Dowse and 
other defendants. By this judgment the title in the Plain-
tiff and Respondent Pender was quieted as to certain real 
property hereinafter described; a certain Sheriff's Cer-
tificate of Sale and a certain Sheriff's Deed hereinafter 
described, were vacated and declared of no force and 
effect; a mortgage executed by Dowse and his wife in 
favor of Appellant A. C. Whittaker was nullified and a 
warranty deed executed by Dowse and his wife to J. E. 
Treadway and Marion Mave Treadway, his wife, was 
also nullified. By this judgment the Respondent Pender 
was also awarded the sum of $754.08, net balance of ren-
tals, the sum of $500.00 for punitive and exemplary dam-
ages, the sum of $1,000.00 attorney's fees and costs with 
6% interest from the date of judgment (R. 249-250). 
Plaintiff's amended complaint seeks to quiet title in 
Plaintiff and Respondent to certain real property herein-
after described situate in Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah, and also attempts to allege facts upon which a 
claim of slander of title is based (R. 24-29). Dowse in 
his answer denied generally and specifically the allega-
tions of the amended complaint (R. 30-31). 
2 
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The present litigation is a sequence of a certain ac-
tion commenced and prosecuted in the aforesaid District 
Court by Dowse, then in the role of plaintiff, against the 
present plaintiff and respondent Pender then in the role 
of defendant. This action bore number 86,895 (Exhibit 
1). Said action resulted in a judgment dated November 
4, 1949, in favor of Dowse against Pender which, among 
other things, awarded Dowse his costs in said action (Ex-
hibit A). Copy of this judgment and decree was duly 
served upon the attorney for Pender on November 4, 
1949 (R. 89-90). Thereafter counsel for Dowse served 
upon Pender's attorney the bill of costs (R. 90-91-180). 
These costs amounted to the sum of $22.80 (R. 25). No 
motion to retax costs was filed and, accordingly, judg-
ment for this amount was duly docketed in favor of 
Dowse against Pender (Exhibit I ; R. 91, 96, 97). 
On January 4,1950, Dowse caused execution to issue 
on the judgment in his favor and against Pender (Ex-
hibits 10 and H) directed to the sheriff of Salt Lake 
County commanding him to collect the aforesaid judg-
ment and costs together with the costs of execution. 
Based on this execution the said sheriff, on February 7, 
1950, levied on the following described real property situ-
ate in Salt Lake County, State of Utah: 
Lots 2, 3, 6 and 7, Block 4, North Columbia Sub-
division; Lots 1, 19 and 20, Block 6, North Co-
lumbia Sub-division; Lots 2, 3, 4, 13 to 21, inclu-
sive, Block 8, North Columbia Subdivision. 
This levy was made in the manner required by law (Ex-
hibit H, K 142-143). 
3 
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After the sheriff had given notice of the time and 
place of sale (E. 142, 143, 144, 182, 183,184) as required 
by law, public sale of the real property upon which levy 
was made was held at the west front door of the City and 
County Building in Salt Lake City, Utah (B. 184) on 
March 14, 1950, at 12:00 o'clock noon (Ex. I ) . Deputy 
Sheriff Bleak conducted said sale. Present thereat in 
addition to Deputy Sheriff Bleak was Dowse and his 
attorney, Mr. LaMar Duncan. Neither Plaintiff and Ee-
spondent Pender nor his attorney were present (E. 139). 
At said offering Dowse bid the sum of $47.46 which was 
the highest and only bid made. Constituting this bid was 
the original sum of $22.80, representing the judgment 
in favor of Dowse with interest, costs and sheriff's fees. 
On March 15, 1950, the Sheriff of Salt Lake County is-
sued to Dowse his Certificate of Sale (Exhibit I) which 
describes the real property hereinabove described. This 
certificate was recorded in the Office of the County Be-
corder of Salt Lake County, Utah, on March 23, 1950, 
in Book 750, page 544, Eecords of said County. 
No redemption was made from said sale and on Sep-
tember 16, 1950, after the full period of six months al-
lowed for redemption had expired the Sheriff of Salt 
Lake County issued his deed conveying the above de-
scribed real property to Dowse (Exhibit K). Said deed 
was duly recorded by Dowse in the office of the County 
Becorder of Salt Lake County, Utah, on September 16, 
1950, in Book 798, page 499, Eecords of said County. 
Subsequent to the issuance and recordation of said 
Sheriff's Deed, to-wit, on October 19, 1950, Dowse and 
4 
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wife conveyed Lots 2 and 3, Block 4, North Columbia 
Sub-division to the defendants and appellants Treadway 
(Exhibit 6 and M). The deed of conveyance was recorded 
in the Office of The County Recorder of Salt Lake 
County, on October 20, 1950, in Book 808, page 617 Rec-
ords of said County. The legal position of the Tread-
ways in this case will be presented by their counsel in a 
separate brief and no attempt will be made by counsel 
for Dowse to discuss this aspect of the case. 
On October 27, 1950, Dowse and wife borrowed the 
sum of $5,000.00 from the Defendant and Appellant Whit-
taker and to secure the repayment thereof executed and 
delivered unto Whittaker their certain mortgage bearing 
said date covering Lots 2, 3 and 4, Block 8, North Co-
lumbia Subdivision (Exhibit L). This mortgage was re-
corded October 31, 1950, in the Office of the County Re-
corder of Salt Lake County, Utah, in Book 811, page 
528 Records of said County. Whittaker, through his 
counsel, has filed his brief in this Court elucidating his 
legal position in this litigation. Counsel for Dowse com-
mend this brief for earnest consideration by the Court 
and will not attempt to enter upon this area of the case. 
It appears clearly from the evidence that the real 
property involved in this action consists of lots within the 
North Columbia Subdivision (Exhibit G). Lots 2 and 3 
of Block 4 are contiguous. They are separated from Lots 
6 and 7, Block 4 by intervening Lots 4 and 5 not involved 
in this case. These four lots are situate at the northeast 
intersection of Paxton Avenue and West Temple Street 
in Salt Lake City. Lots 1, 19 and 20, Block 6, and Lots 
5 
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13 to 21, Block 8, are situate on Richards Street and 
represent one composite area. Lots 2, 3 and 4, Block 8, 
are adjacent and are situate at the northeast corner of 
the intersection of 13th South and West Temple Streets 
in Salt Lake City (Exhibits C, D, E, F, G, 4). 
According to Deputy Sheriff Bleak all of the real 
property was offered for sale at the public vendue as a 
whole (R. 139) and there was no request made to offer 
any of the property separately (R. 139, 140). Also, ac-
cording to Bleak separate notices of sale, four in all, 
were posted on each non-contiguous group of Lots (R. 
144). As opposed to Bleak's testimony Mr. LaMar Dun-
can, attorney for Dowse, in action 86,985, testified that 
Bleak offered for sale Lots 2, 3, 6 and 7, Block 4, as a 
separate unit; Lots 1, 19 and 20, Block 6, as a separate 
unit, and Lots 2, 3, 4, 13 to 21, Block 8, as a separate 
group (R. 184, 185). There (sic) were not offered each 
separate lot but the bid was in three parcels (R. 185). 
It appears that at the time the deputy sheriff made 
his levy there was delivered to him by Duncan, as attor-
ney for Dowse, a praecipe dated January 31, 1950 (Ex-
hibit X) wherein the sheriff was requested to levy and 
sell Lots 2, 3, 6 and 7, Block 4, Lots 1, 19 and 20, Block 
6, Lots 2, 3, 4, 13 to 21 inclusive, Block 8, "all of which 
real property stands in the name of Rennold Pender upon 
the records of the County Recorder of Salt Lake County" 
(Exhibit X). 
On November 13, 1952, the plaintiff proposed the 
form of Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judg-
6 
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ment (B. 251). On November 14,1952, Dowse served and 
filed his Objection to the Proposed Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Judgment (R. 236-238). The 
Court overruled and denied the Objections and signed and 
filed the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judg-
ment on November 22, 1952 (R. 239-250). On November 
26, 1952, Dowse served and filed his Motion for a New 
Trial (R. 253). This motion was denied on December 
20, 1952, (R. 253A). On December 22, 1952, after due 
notice, the Court permitted plaintiff to amend his Amend-
ed Complaint by adding certain allegations thereto in 
order to conform to proof (R. 259). Dowse filed his No-
tice of Appeal to the Supreme Court on January 19, 
1953 (R. 267) and on the same date filed with the Clerk 
of the District Court his Designation of Record on Appeal 
(R. 265-266). On January 28, 1953, Dowse filed with the 
Clerk of the Court his Undertaking on Appeal (R. 269-
270). The Record on Appeal was filed with the Clerk of 
the Supreme Court on January 30,1953. 
PRETRIAL ORDER 
On June 13, 1951, a pretrial of this action was held 
before the Honorable A. H. Ellett, a Judge of the above 
entitled Court. A pretrial order was made, entered and 
filed by him on June 22,1951 (R. 32-35) which was never 
amended or changed. All pleadings were merged into 
the order (R. 35). By this Order counsel agreed upon 
certain facts. (The facts pertaining to the Whittaker 
mortgage and the conveyance of property to the Tread-
7 
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ways are specifically excluded from this recital.) The 
facts agreed upon were: 
" 1 . That there was a case filed between S. 
W. Dowse as plaintiff and Eennold Pender, de-
fendant, on August 25, 1949, being case No. 
86895; that the matter was tried on November 3, 
1949, before the Honorable Koald A. Hogenson; 
that on said day the court announced that he would 
give judgment to the plaintiff, S. W. Dowse, quiet-
ing title to the property involved in the lawsuit, 
and would give judgment in favor of the defendant 
for no cause of action insofar as that suit related 
to a slander of title. 
"2. That on November 4, 1949, Milton V. 
Backman, attorney for defendant, Kennnold Pen-
der, received copies of findings of fact, conclu-
sions of law, and a decree in case 86895 and that 
in said decree paragraph 4 stated that plaintiff 
should have and recover his costs herein; that on 
November 9, 1949, a cost bill in the amount of 
$22.80 was served upon Harland W. Clark of the 
firm of Backman, Backman& Clark, the attorneys 
for the defendant. 
"3. That no motion to retax costs was ever 
made nor was an appeal from the judgment ever 
taken. 
"4. That thereafter and on the 4th day of 
January, 1950, an execution was issued and placed 
in the hands of the sheriff of Salt Lake County, 
and that at said time a praecipe was issued by 
attorney for S. W. Dowse, plaintiff, in said mat-
ter, wherein the sheriff of Salt Lake County was 
directed to sell the interests of the defendant, 
Eennold Pender, in and to the real property de-
scribed in paragraph 1 of plaintiff's amended com-
plaint herein. 
8 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
"5. That S. W. Dowse agreed to pay Ren-
nold Pender the sum of $100.00, which sum was 
paid to the defendant, Rennold Pender, on or 
about the 29th day of November, 1949, and that 
the defendant, Rennold Pender, agreed to give to 
S. W. Dowse a quitclaim deed to the property in-
volved in the lawsuit in case No. 86895 filed in 
this court; and that the deed covering said prop-
erty was delivered to S. W. Dowse on or about 
the 29th day of November, 1949, and was recorded 
on said date. 
"6. That the purpose of making the agree-
ment whereby Dowse was to pay Pender $100.00 
and Pender was to sign a quitclaim deed was to en-
able Dowse to complete a pending sale which 
he then had. 
"7. That the real property described in 
paragraph 1 of plaintiff's amended complaint con-
sists of three non-contiguous parcels of land and 
was described as consisting of nineteen separate 
lots. 
"8. That while Rennold Pender claims in 
this action that the sale was made as one parcel, 
counsel are agreed that the sale was made in not 
more than three parcels. 
"9. That S. W. Dowse did not direct the 
sheriff to sell any personal property and that the 
sheriff sold no personal property in satisfying the 
judgment under the execution placed in his hands. 
"10. That S. W. Dowse bid the property de-
scribed in paragraph 1 of plaintiff's amended com-
plaint in for the sum of $47.46, being the principal 
costs of $22.80, $.50 for execution, $.63 interest 
to sale date, $23.53 sheriff costs, making a total 
amount of $47.46, and that no other property was 
sold by the sheriff." (R. 32, 33, 34). 
9 
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The Court defined the issues of fact to be tried as 
follows: 
"1 . Did the sheriff offer the property which 
was sold pursuant to execution as one parcel? 
"2. What was the value on March 14, 1950, 
of the various parcels of land described in plain-
tiff's complaint and sold by the sheriff under the 
execution in case No. 86895? 
"3. Was there personalty belonging to Een-
nold Pender at the time of the execution sale which 
was available for the satisfaction of the judgment 
which S. W. Dowse held against him? 
"4. Did S. W. Dowse agree to satisfy the 
judgment in connection with the transaction 
wherein he paid $100.00 to Eennold Pender and 
received a quitclaim deed from Pender? 
"5. Did Eennold Pender agree to forego an 
appeal in case 86895 in connection with the tran-
saction mentioned in paragraph 4 above? 
"6. * * * 
"7. # * # 
"8. # * * 
« Q # # # 
"10. Did S. W. Dowse act maliciously in di-
recting the sheriff to sell the real property under 
the execution herein and if he did, what would be 
the amount of punitive damages to assess against 
S. W. Dowse in case Eennold Pender prevails in 
this lawsuit? 
"11. What has been the reasonable rental 
value since the 14th day of March, 1950, of the 
real property sold at sheriff's sale under the ex-
ecution in case No. 86895 ? 
10 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
"12. Did S. "W. Dowse slander the title of the 
realty described in paragraph 1 of plaintiff's 
amended complaint by causing the same to be sold 
at sheriff's sale and to be mortgaged and sold 
to the other defendants in this action? 
"13. Did Rennold Pender have actual notice 
that a sale of the real property described in para-
graph 1 of his amended complaint was to be made 
upon execution?" (R. 34,35). 
The order fixed the issues of law as follows: 
"1. Was the sheriff's sale under execution 
void by reason of not offering the real property 
by separate lots? 
"2. Can the plaintiff, Rennold Pender, in 
this proceeding attack the judgment for $22.80 
given in case 86895?" (R. 35). 
STATEMENT OF POINTS AND ARGUMENT 
I 
WHETHER A JUDGMENT DEBTOR AGAINST 
WHOM IS DOCKETED AN UNPAID MONEY JUDGMENT 
MAY BY AN INDEPENDENT COLLATERAL ACTION 
AGAINST THE JUDGMENT CREDITOR SECURE 
RELIEF FROM A SHERIFF'S SALE AFTER THE 
ISSUANCE BY THE SHERIFF OF HIS DEED OF CON-
VEYANCE TO THE JUDGMENT CREDITOR, WHO WAS 
THE PURCHASER AT SAID SALE OF THE JUDGMENT 
DEBTOR'S REAL PROPERTY WHICH WAS LEVIED 
ON PURSUANT TO A VALID WRIT OF EXECUTION 
ISSUED ON SAID JUDGMENT ON THE GROUNDS (A) 
OF IRREGULARITIES IN CONDUCT OF SALE; (B) OF 
INADEQUACY OF CONSIDERATION OR BID PRICE; 
(C) THAT THE SALE OF REAL ESTATE WAS EN 
MASSE INSTEAD OF IN SEPARATE PARCELS; (D) 
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THAT THE JUDGMENT WAS NOT SATISFIED FROM 
AVAILABLE PERSONAL PROPERTY OF THE JUDG-
MENT DEBTOR BEFORE RESORTING TO HIS REAL 
PROPERTY; AND (E) THAT THE JUDGMENT DEBTOR 
HAD NO KNOWLEDGE OF THE LEVY AND SHERIFFS 
SALE OF HIS REAL PROPERTY? 
The provisions of Eule 69 Utah Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure are pertinent in determining the correct answer 
to the question here propounded. For convenience of 
the Court the following excerpts from the Rules of Civil 
Procedure are here inserted. 
"The writ of execution must be issued in the 
name of the State of Utah, sealed with the seal 
of the Court and subscribed by the clerk. * * * 
It must intelligbly refer to the judgment stating 
the court, the county where the same is entered 
or docketed, the names of the parties, the judg-
ment, and, if it is for money the amount thereof 
and the amount actually due thereon. It shall be 
directed to the sheriff of the county in which it is 
to be executed and shall require the officer to 
proceed in accordance with the terms of the 
writ; provided that if such writ is against the 
property of the judgment debtor generally it shall 
direct the officer to satisfy the judgment with 
interest out of the personal property of the debtor 
and if sufficient personal property cannot be 
found then out of his real property. * * *" (Rule 
69 (b)). 
"Unless the execution otherwise directs the 
officer must execute the writ against the property 
of the judgment debtor by levying on sufficient 
amount of property if there is sufficient, # * *. 
When there is more property of the judgment 
debtor than is sufficient to satisfy the judgment 
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and accruing costs within view of the officer, he 
must levy only on such part of the property as the 
judgment debtor may indicate, if the property 
indicated is amply sufficient to satisfy the judg-
ment and costs. * * *" (Eule 69 (d)). 
"(1) Notice. Before the sale of the proper-
ty on execution notice thereof must be given as 
follows: * * * (3) In case of real property, by 
posting a similar notice, particularly describing 
the property, for 21 days, on the property to be 
sold, at the place of sale, and also in at least 3 
public places of the precinct or city where the 
property to be sold is situated, and publishing a 
copy thereof at least 3 times, once a week for 3 
successive weeks immediately preceding the sale, 
in some newspaper published in the county, if 
there is one." (Eule 69 (e) (1)). 
" (3) Conduct of Sale. All sales of property 
under execution must be made at auction to the 
highest bidder, between the hours of 9 o'clock 
a.m. and 5 o'clock p.m. After sufficient property 
has been sold to satisfy the execution no more 
shall be sold. Neither the officer holding the execu-
tion nor his deputy shall become a purchaser, or 
be interested in any purchase at such sale. When 
the sale is of personal property capable of manual 
delivery it must be within view of those who 
attend the sale, and it must be sold in such 
parcels as are likely to bring the highest price; 
and when the sale is of real property, consisting 
of several known lots or parcels, they must be 
sold separately; or when a portion of such real 
property is claimed by a third person, and he 
requires it to be sold separately, such portion 
must be thus sold. All sales of real property must 
be made at the courthouse of the county in which 
the property, or some part thereof, is situated. 
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The judgment debtor, if present at the sale, may 
also direct the order in which the property, real 
or personal, shall be sold, when such property 
consists of several known lots or parcels, or of 
articles which can be sold to advantage separate-
ly, and the officer must follow such directions." 
(Rule 69 (e) (3)). 
"(6) Real Property. Upon a sale of real 
property the officer shall give to the purchaser 
a certificate of sale, containing: (1) a particular 
description of the real property sold; (2) the 
price paid by him for each lot or parcel if sold 
separately; (3) the whole price paid; (4) a state-
ment to the effect that all right, title, interest and 
claim of the judgment debtor in and to the proper-
ty is conveyed to the purchaser; provided that 
where such sale is subject to redemption that 
fact shall be stated also. A duplicate of such 
certificate shall be filed for record by the officer 
in the office of the recorder of the county. The 
real property sold shall be subject to redemption, 
except where the estate sold is less than a lease-
hold of a two-years' unexpired term, in which 
event said sale is absolute." (Rule 69 (e) (6)). 
"(3) Time for Redemption, Amount to be 
Paid. The property may be redeemed from the 
purchaser within six months after the sale on 
paying the amount of his purchase with 6 per 
cent thereon in addition, together with the amount 
of any assessment or taxes, and any reasonable 
sum for fire insurance and necessary maintenance, 
upkeep, or repair of any improvements upon the 
property which the purchaser may have paid 
thereon after the purchase, with interest on such 
amounts, and, if the purchaser is also a creditor 
having a lien prior to that of the person seeking 
redemption, other than the judgment under which 
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said purchase was made, the amount of such 
lien, with interest" (Rule 69 (f) (3)). 
"If no redemption is made within six months 
after the sale, the purchaser or his assignee is 
entitled to a conveyance; * * * If the debtor 
redeems, the effect of the sale is terminated and 
he is restored to his estate. * * *" (Rule 69 (f) 
(5)). 
The judgment against Pender in the amount of 
$22.80 in action No. 86895 stands as a valid judgment. 
The issuance of the writ of execution on said judgment 
at the behest of the judgment creditor Dowse was in 
all respects free from legal defects. Under question is 
the method of the sheriff in conducting the execution 
sale. If there were irregularities in such sale Pender 
had a quick and easy method of bringing such irreg-
ularities to the attention of the Court. A motion by 
him to set aside the sale and recall the sheriff's certificate 
of sale made at any time during the period of redemption 
would have afforded him complete relief. This is the 
usual and ordinary remedy available to a judgment 
debtor who believes that an execution sale has been 
unfairly or illegally conducted by the sheriff. Pender 
did not avail himself of this remedy but waited until 
one and a half months had expired after the sheriff's 
deed had issued to commence the present action. He is, 
therefore, collaterally attacking the execution sale in 
the present litigation with resultant limitations upon 
such course of action. Review of pertinent authorities 
will quickly show that he is narrowly confined in his 
present attack and that many of the grounds upon which 
he alleges the sale to be void cannot be raised in the 
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present action even though they might have been the 
basis for setting aside the sale had he availed himself 
of a direct attack upon it through a motion to set it 
aside. 
"The general rule is that if there is any 
ground for relief against an execution, such relief 
must be sought in the original cause, and not by a 
new and independent proceeding. This rule is 
upheld of course, not merely in regard to original 
writs of execution, but also in regard to alias and 
pluries writs of execution. The rule prevails 
where the collateral attack is sought to be made 
because of a clerical error or because of an irreg-
ularity committed by the execution officer, such 
as a sale made in violation of a stay of execution, 
or after a defective appraisement, or without 
any appraisement, or, in general, because of de-
fects or irregularities in connection with the 
execution which do not render it void, particularly 
where no one sustains an injury thereby and 
where the sale has been confirmed. There are, 
however, some cases in which a confirmation of 
the sale is held not to preclude a collateral attack 
thereon. The collateral attack may be made where 
the execution is void, and the same remedy is 
available in certain cases of fraud. These general 
rules are applicable to execution deeds which 
may not be impeached collaterally for mere irreg-
ularity, although the defendant in execution may 
deny the validity of such a deed if made to one 
who was not the purchaser, but a stranger to the 
proceedings." (21 Am. Jur. Executions, Sec. 519, 
pp. 258-259). 
Pender attacks the execution sale on the theory 
that it was void because (a) of irregularities in conduct 
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of sale; (b) of inadequacy of consideration or bid price; 
(c) that the sale of real estate was en masse instead of 
in separate parcels; (d) that there was available per-
sonal property of sufficient value and amount to satisfy 
the judgment with interest and costs without resorting 
to his real property; (e) that he had no knowledge of 
the levy and sheriff's sale of his real property, and (f) 
that Dowse was guilty of fraud. 
The present discussion will be directed to points (a), 
(b), (c), (d) and (e). 
There are four cases decided by the Utah Supreme 
Court which are of particular interest in determining 
the validity of the sheriff's sale under points here in-
volved. The first is Dickert v. Weise, 2 Ut. 350; 40 Pac. 
States Reports, 350. This was a mortgage foreclosure 
proceeding wherein it was contended that the foreclosure 
sale was void because the property was not sold separate-
ly but sold en masse. The attack was a direct attack 
on appeal from the judgment and from an order over-
ruling the motion to set aside the sale. It was, therefore, 
unlike the present collateral action. The Court wrote: 
"But it urged that the sale was not properly 
conducted; that the property was not sold sep-
arately as required by statute, but was all sold 
together, and that the sale should, therefore, be 
set aside. i 
"The statute requires that when real estate 
is to be sold on execution, and is composed of 
several known lots, they shall be sold separately. 
In this case the parcels of property were offered 
separately by the officer, but there were no bid-
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ders. Thereupon the officer offered all of the 
property together, and it brought the whole 
amount of the judgment and costs. The object 
of the statute, no doubt, was to have the property 
sell for the highest possible price, and this view 
of the statute is borne out by the language of the 
section itself. C.L., Sec. 1448. 
"The object of the law was secured, and the 
action of the court below in overruling the motion 
to set aside the sale was proper." 
The second case is National Realty Sales Co. v. 
Ewmg, 55 Ut. 438; 186 Pac. 1103. The action was a col-
lateral attack by way of an action to quiet title against 
a purchaser of land on execution sale by the judgment 
debtor's grantee. It was contended that the levy and 
sale were excessive and irregular for the reason that the 
real property sold consisted of several distinct parcels 
of land of much greater value than the amount of the 
judgment under which it was sold and that the said 
lands were all sold as one parcel. The judgment upon 
which the sale was held was for $154.00, interest and 
costs. Pursuant to a writ of execution the sheriff sold 
the property to the judgment creditor for the amount 
of the judgment and issued a certificate of sale. After 
the period of redemption expired sheriff's deed was 
issued to the purchaser and within a year the property 
was sold by him for $1,600.00. The new owner placed a 
mortgage thereon for $2,000.00. As to the inadequacy 
of consideration the Supreme Court ruled : 
"It does seem that the property now under 
consideration was sold under the execution for 
an inadequate price. However, mere inadequacy 
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of price was not sufficient to invalidate the sale 
when the proceedings were fair and regular and 
there is nothing in the record to suggest fraud or 
concealment." 
With respect to the claim that the land was com-
posed of more than one parcel, the Court commented: 
"Under our statute, Comp. Laws Utah, 1917, 
Sec. 6934, with respect to execution sales, Henry 
S. Tanner or the plaintiff, could have directed 
the sale of the property to have been made in par-
cels, if he so desired. The land was, as the testi-
mony shows, but one parcel within the meaning of 
the law. Moreover, the plaintiff could have then 
asserted its claim of ownership, which it did not 
do." 
In Chausse v. Bank of Garland, 71 Ut. 586, 268 Pac. 
781-783, the Court said: 
"The allegations of the complaint concerning 
the disproportionate bids of the defendant bar^k 
for the several tracts of real estate at the last 
foreclosure sale present no independent grounds 
for legal redress. Judicial sales, otherwise reg-
ular, may not be impeached for disproportionate 
or inadequate prices. The right of the complain-
ing party to bid higher, or, as in this case, to 
redeem any one of the tracts sold, is the protection 
which the law affords from the matters com-
plained of. The hardship resulting to the plaintiff 
in the present case arose out of the failure of 
the bank to make higher bids for tracts 1 and 2 
of the real estate sold. The amount a prospective 
purchaser shall bid at such sales cannot be reg-
ulated by law. There being no irregularity or 
wrongful or unlawful act alleged in the proceed-
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ings it follows that the complaint failed to state 
a cause of action." 
Adams v. Pratt, District Judge, et al., 87 Utah 80; 
48 Pac. (2d) 444? is the fourth case of concern. It was 
an original proceeding in the Supreme Court for a writ 
of prohibition against Judge Eugene E. Pratt when he 
sat as a judge of the Second Judicial District Court in 
and for Davis County. There had been a prior mortgage 
foreclosure action by Barnes Banking Company against 
the petitioner Adams. Judgment had been entered in 
favor of the Bank and the mortgaged property ordered 
sold to satisfy the judgment. The property was bid in 
as one parcel by the Banking Company. No redemption 
was made from the sale and sheriff's deed issued to the 
Bank. Thereafter the Bank applied for a writ of assist-
ance to place it in possession of the mortgaged premises. 
At that point Adams moved the District Court for an 
order to vacate and set aside the writ on the grounds 
that he had filed a petition in the United States District 
Court of Utah for debtor's relief and as a consequence 
the Federal Court had exclusive jurisdiction of the 
property. The State District Court first stayed the writ 
and then refused further stay. At this point in the 
litigation Adams filed a suit against the Barnes Bank-
ing Company wherein he sought to have the sale of the 
mortgaged property set aside because the same was sold 
in one parcel. This action was not prosecuted to con-
clusion. The Federal District Court by order in the 
debtor's relief proceedings permitted the Banking Com-
pany to pursue its remedies in the District Court of 
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Davis County and authorized the latter Court to adjudi-
cate the controversy between the parties. Following the 
action of the Federal Court, Adams instituted the pro-
ceedings for the writ of prohibition against Judge Pratt. 
As to the point raised by Adams that the mortgage fore-
closure sale was void because the property was sold en 
masse the Court said: 
"Nor do the authorities support plaintiff's 
contention that the sale of the property in the 
mortgage foreclosure suit en masse is void. On 
the contrary, this court has held that it is proper 
in the mortgage foreclosure suit to sell the proper-
ty en masse if bids for the separate lots or parcels 
cannot be had. Dickert v. Weise, 2 Utah, 350. 
The cases are generally to the effect that a sale 
of property en masse, even where it should be 
sold separately, is not such an irregularity as 
renders the sale void. * * * For stronger reasons 
it may not be said that the court below was with-
out jurisdiction to issue the writ of assistance 
here brought in question." 
The leading case in Colorado where the statutes 
direct the manner of conducting an execution sale similar 
to the provisions of the above quoted Eules of Pro-
cedure in Utah is the case of Victor Investment Co. v. 
Roerig, 22 Colo. App. 257, 124 Pac. 349. This was a col-
lateral attack to set aside an execution sale and to cancel 
the sheriff's deed on a judgment for $113.85 and costs. 
The property had been bid in at the sheriff's sale for 
the sum of $100.00. The value of the property was at 
least $2,000.00, encumbered with a mortgage of $1,200.00. 
The trial court concluded that inadequacy of price and 
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circumstances of unfairness justified it in nullifying the 
sale. The following excerpts from the Court of Appeals' 
opinion are pertinent: 
"We have not been referred to any authority 
in support of the conclusion that under such cir-
cumstances the bid of $100.00 for the property 
at the execution sale was grossly out of propor-
tion to its true value. The general trend of 
judicial opinion seems to be to the contrary, espe-
cially where the debtor is allowed by law a right 
of redemption from the sale. 'At judicial sales, 
where there is a redemption, it is a well-known 
fact that lands, unless where necessary to secure 
the debt, are rarely sold at anything approximat-
ing their real value. Such purchases are not look-
ed upon as a desirable mode of investment. There 
is seldom competition. The creditor, for the most 
part, has to take the land in satisfaction of his 
debt and wait for it to be redeemed/ * # *" 
"It is probably true that the officer in making 
the levy followed the usual custom of filing a 
certificate of levy with the county recorder, and 
it is a matter of presumption that a duplicate of 
the certificate of sale issued to the purchaser was 
recorded, as provided by law. It is not claimed 
that appellee did not have knowledge of the judg-
ment against him, and he also knew that it wras 
unsatisfied. His remaining in ignorance of the 
execution was due to inattention to his own 
affairs, as was also his failure to protect what-
ever equity there was in the family residence by 
taking advantage of the homestead law. It would 
seem, then, that he has only himself to blame for 
his misfortune, from which equity is powerless 
to relieve him. The courts are without power to 
arbitrarily extend the statutory period for re-
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demption, for the purpose of relieving the hard-
ships of individual cases, in the absence of some 
recognized ground for equitable interference. The 
attitude of the appellant in holding to the advan-
tage obtained through legal forms may be char-
acterized as hard and unconscionable, but such 
shortcomings are cognizable only in foro consci-
entise, and not in foro legis. To sustain the 
decree of the district court upon the facts appear-
ing in this record would be to declare the execu-
tion of a sheriff's deed, after sale under execution 
and expiration of the time allowed for redemp-
tion, the excuse for the institution of a new litiga-
tion. The judgment must be reversed." 
There are many California decisions involving the 
power of Court to set aside an execution sale and 
sheriff's deed issued pursuant thereto on both direct 
and collateral attack. One of the earliest cases is Smith 
v. Randall, 6 Cal. 47; 2 Pacific States Keports 47. This 
was a direct attack upon the execution sale by way of 
an order to show cause. The trial court set aside the 
sale but on appeal the Supreme Court sustained the 
sale. Eeversing the trial court's judgment the Supreme 
Court wrote: 
"The respondent contends that the seizure 
and sale of said land was illegal and void, be-
cause: 1st. The notice of sale did not particularly 
describe the land, and said notice was not posted 
twenty days before the day of sale. 2d. That 
defendant being the owner of personal property 
sufficient to satisfy the judgment, could not waive 
the necessity of having such personal property 
sold in preference to the land, because the rights 
of the mortgagee would be prejudiced by a sale of 
the land. 3d. The land consisted of separate 
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parcels, and was sold as one tract. 4th. The price 
for which the land was sold is greatly inadequate 
to its value. 
"It has been often decided that the provisions 
of statutes similar to ours, with respect to levy 
and notice of sale under execution, are merely 
directory, and the failure of the officers to com-
ply with the requirements of the law, in this 
respect, would not vitiate such sale, but the 
party aggrieved by his neglect is left to his rem-
edy by an action against the officer. 6 Mun. I l l , 
3 Bibb, 216. This rule is founded in justice and 
sound policy." 
Bechtel v. Weir, 152 Cal. 443; 93 Pac, 75; 15 LRA 
(N'S) 549. This decision holds that the failure of the 
sheriff to sell separate parcels of land separately and in 
selling them en masse does not render the sale void sub-
ject to collateral attack. Here the court said: 
"We have so far considered the question of 
the sale to the extent of determining that, at the 
worst, it was not void, but voidable merely, and 
that respondent's remedy was by direct proceed-
ings within a seasonable time to vacate the sale, — 
proceedings which were never taken. But equally 
demonstrable is the proposition that, in the ab-
sence of fraud and injury shown, the sale en 
masse of the two parcels of land, under the cir-
cumstances indicated by the sheriff's return, was 
not even irregular, but was a perfectly valid exer-
cise of power." 
Another California case which is relevant to this 
discussion is Morris v. Winans, 30 Cal. App. 575; 159 
Pac. 213. An execution sale was held upon a judgment 
for $189.62. No motion was made to set aside the execu-
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tion nor the sale thereon and a sheriff's certificate of 
sale and deed were issued to the purchaser. The execu-
tion debtor commenced an independent collateral action 
to declare null and void the sheriff's certificate and deed. 
It appears that there had been a first judgment in the 
action which was vacated on appeal and upon re-trial 
a new judgment was entered in favor of the plaintiff. 
The writ of execution through error described the first 
judgment but in all other particulars was regular and 
conformed to the second judgment properly setting out 
the amount thereof, etc. The following excerpt indicates 
the limitation in collateral attacks against an execution 
sale: 
"It is claimed, first, that the execution sale 
was void because in the writ the date of the entry 
of judgment was misstated in that the date given 
was that of the first judgment which had been 
set aside, and not of the last and final judgment 
in the action. If this irregularity rendered the 
writ entirely void, plaintiff was entitled to relief; 
otherwise not. If the writ was merely irregular 
and subject to an amendment, the plaintiff can-
not attack it in this way as against the defendant, 
a purchaser for value." 
The court decided that the irregularity described 
did not render the sale void. 
Batini v. Ivamick, 105 Cal. App. 391, 287 Pac. 523. 
This action is of particular interest in this instant case. 
This was a collateral attack upon a sheriff's sale and 
deed issued pursuant thereto. It was agreed that there 
was no irregularity as to any proceedings up to the 
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time of the issuance of the writ of execution under 
which the sheriff's sale was made. The appellants con-
tended in making the sale no legal or sufficient notice 
thereof was given and that the property sold consisting 
of three parcels of real estate was sold en masse. In 
disposing of the first contention the Court confirmed 
the doctrine of Smith vs. Randall, supra, in the following 
language: 
"Plaintiff rests his claim upon a sheriff's 
deed. Defendants contend that the deed is void 
and of no effect. Both sides here agree that the 
sole question presented both in the court below 
and here is on the validity of said sheriff's deed. 
The trial court held that the deed was effective 
to transfer title and entered its decree in favor 
of plaintiff, and the defendants appeal. At the 
outset, it may be noted that no claim of irregular-
ity is made as to any proceeding up to the time 
of the issuance of the writ of execution under 
which the sheriff's sale was made. In other words, 
the writ of execution was regularly issued. Appel-
lants contend that in making the sale no legal or 
sufficient notice thereof was given and that the 
property sold, consisting of three parcels of real 
estate, was sold en masse.* * *" 
"As stated, a review of the cited authorities 
will disclose, beyond dispute, that our courts are 
still committed to the earlier rule. Particularly 
is this true where the attack is collateral and 
no showing, other than of defective or insufficient 
notice, is made. Doubtless much well-directed 
criticism may appear justifiable and many plau-
sible arguments might be advanced against the 
holding. But all of these arguments have been 
weighed and considered and found insufficient to 
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disturb the rule. Obviously, the courts have had 
in mind the harmful results following an easy 
voiding of judicial sales and have decided that 
mere deviation from the statute would not bring 
such results, unless by the statute itself so pro-
vided. And further than this, the courts have 
always lent a willing ear to the debtor who could 
show fraud or unfairness in the sale of his prop-
erty, and where a proper showing has been made 
full relief has followed. No such showing is at-
tempted here." 
As to the second contention the court held that such 
action by the sheriff did not render the sale void but 
only voidable and that such defect could only be reached 
by direct motion to set aside the sale. 
Mitchell v. Alpha Hardware & Supply Co., 7 Cal. 
App. (2d) 52; 45 Pac. (2d) 442, decided that in a col-
lateral attack upon an execution sale after the period 
of redemption had expired that it is too late to attack 
the sale on the ground that the property was sold en 
masse instead of in separate parcels. In support of its 
conclusion the court cited Gregory v. Bovier, 77 Gal. 121, 
19 P. 232. 
Knapp v. Rose, 32 Cal. (2d) 530; 197 Pac. (2d) 7. 
By an independent action in equity the plaintiff sought 
to set aside a sale upon writ of enforcement. The court 
after discussing the difference under California prac-
tice between a writ of execution and a writ of enforce-
ment held that such objection was an irregularity which 
could be raised only by a motion to set aside the sale 
and not by separate proceeding for that purpose. The 
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court cited Culver v. Scarborough, 73 Cal. App. 441,144; 
238 Pac. 1104, 1105, and quoted the following from said 
decision: 
"At the outset it may be stated as a general 
rule supported by many authorities that a pro-
ceeding to set aside a sale under execution, except-
ing where some special facts are alleged which 
may create jurisdiction in a court of equity, the 
proper procedure is by motion to vacate the sale 
in the action under which it is claimed any irreg-
ularities occurred." 
Passing to the State of Montana there is an inter-
esting group of decisions very much in point. The first 
is Thomas vs. Thomas, 44 Mont. 102; 119 Pac. 283. This 
case was a collateral attack upon a foreclosure sale. 
The purchaser after receiving the sheriff's deed peti-
tioned the court to be put in possession of the property. 
The appellant contested this application primarily be-
cause the premises consisted of several known lots and 
parcels of land which were not sold separately. The 
court said: 
«• * * The statute requiring known pieces and 
parcels of land to be sold separately is merely 
directory. At most, the sale in gross is voidable, 
and not void. It is not open to collateral attack. 
There is not anything in the statute to indicate 
an intention on the part of the lawmaking body 
to declare the sale void for failure to sell sep-
arately, and there are, we think, many reasons, 
founded in equitable considerations, why it should 
not be so considered.* * * At most, the failure 
to sell separately is a mere irregularity, which 
may or may not result in prejudice to the defend-
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ant. If he deems himself aggrieved, he may move 
to have the sale set aside and the property resold, 
or he may proceed by bill in equity. Either 
method would constitute a direct attack upon the 
sale. But he ought not to be permitted to remain 
silent and inactive until demand is made for pos-
session, and then resist such demand by collateral 
attack upon the proceedings leading up to the 
sale." 
Fox vs. Curry, 96 Mont. 212, 29 Pac. (2d) 663. The 
plaintiff in this action recovered a money judgment and 
caused execution to be issued thereon. Defendant moved 
to set aside the sale and upon denial of his motion 
appealed. Although this was a direct attack on the sale 
the appellate court refused to reverse the judgment. 
In part it said: 
"It is noteworthy that the defendant, the 
judgment debtor, or some one representing him, 
might have been present at the sale, and might 
have directed the order in which the property 
should be sold. But he was not there, nor was he 
represented. The sale was made at public auction, 
and the only persons present were the sheriff and 
Mr. Young. After the sheriff was apprised of 
the condition upon which Mr. Young would bid, 
it would have been an idle ceremony to have 
offered the parcels separately. Had there been 
other persons present, doubtless it would have 
been the imperative duty of the sheriff to offer 
them separately. The fact that the property was 
sold in gross under the circumstances is not a 
sufficient reason for setting the sale aside. So 
far as the record shows, the entire transaction 
was in good faith. In the circumstances, the 
property could have been sold only in the manner 
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in which it was, in gross. And 'the creditor is not 
to be foreclosed of his effort to collect his debt 
by the mere want of bidders for the different 
parcels.' Burton v. Kipp, supra; Thomas v. 
Thomas, 44 Mont. 102, 119 P. 283, Ann. Cas. 
1913B, 616. If the judgment debtor had attended 
the sale, of which it must be held that he had 
due notice, and had he required the property to 
be sold in separate parcels, as was his right, then 
the provisions for redemption would have afford-
ed protection to him, and he might have made 
redemption of any parcel sold. That he did not 
follow this course is his own fault." 
Hcrngan vs. Yale Oil Corporation, 124 Mont. 1, 217 
Pac. (2d) 1084. Under the Montana probate practice a 
proceeding for the private sale of decedent's land is 
separate from the administration of his estate, although 
it arises in the course of the administration and is in 
the nature of an action of which the presentation of the 
petition is the commencement and the order confirming 
sale is the final judgment. The jurisdiction over it is 
not included in the general jurisdiction over the admin-
istration. After an order confirming the private sale 
of real estate by an administrator with the will annexed 
and after his delivery of deed to the purchaser two 
minor devisees in an independent action sought to quiet 
title to the real estate involved. The petition for the 
sale of the property and the order to show cause complied 
with the requirements of the statute. Jurisdiction was, 
therefore, conferred upon the court. The publication of 
the notice of sale by the administrator with the will 
annexed did not comply with the provisions of the stat-
ute. It was held that since the court held jurisdiction 
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over all of the parties interested in the estate that irreg-
ularities in the conduct of the sale could only be shown 
upon direct appeal "* * * The regularity could not be 
attacked in a collateral proceeding.* * *" This decision 
was based upon the prior ruling of the Court in Plains 
Land and Improvement Company vs. Lynch, 38 Mont. 
271, 289; 99 Pac. 847. 
The decision of the Supreme Court of Idaho in 
Coghlan vs. City of Boise, 36 Ida. 613; 212 Pac. 867, 
involved a collateral attack by way of an action to quiet 
title to a certain parcel of land which had been sold 
pursuant to a judgment entered in a judicial foreclosure 
of a tax lien. Under the Idaho statute a judgment debtor 
being present at an execution sale of real property had 
the right to direct the order in which such property 
should be sold. The court said: 
"The sale of separate parcels of real proper-
ty en masse in disregard of [the statute] is not 
void, but only voidable and subject to be set 
aside on timely and proper application, and a 
sale en masse is not prohibited by said section 
where the lots or parcels cannot be separately 
sold." 
Mt. Vernon National Bank vs. Morse, 128 Ore. 64; 
264 Pac. 439, contains the following statement: 
"The order of the court striking the allega-
tion from the answer is sustained. Sale of land 
or an interest therein on execution without the 
statutory notice is an irregularity when the court 
has jurisdiction of the subject matter and of 
the parties. For the purpose of directing a sale 
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of the real property, the court, in the state of 
Washington, had jurisdiction both of the parties 
and the subject-matter. The sale was confirmed. 
Defendant's attack thereon is collateral and is 
therefore not available to defendant in this 
• , • action." 
Whitworth v. McKee, 32 Wash. 83; 72 Pac. 1046, 
was a collateral attack by way of an independent action 
to set aside a sale of real property on an execution. 
The defendant contended that because the sheriff had 
not made search for personal property with which to
 4 
satisfy the writ before levying upon the real property, 
the sale was void. The court said: 
"* * * it is not the rule that a sale of real 
property is void merely because the sheriff failed 
to return that he had been unable to find 
sufficient personalty to satisfy the writ before 
levying upon the real estate of the judgment 
debtor, even when the statute expressly provides, 
which ours does not, that the sheriff shall first 
levy upon the debtor's personal property. In a 
collateral action brought to set aside the sale, it 
will be presumed that the officer performed his 
duty in this respect. But statutes of this char-
acter are rarely held mandatory: the better rule 
is that they are directory merely, furnishing a 
ground upon which a confirmation of a sale might 
be successfully resisted, were it shown that there 
was personal property out of which the judgment 
could have been satisfied, but they do not make 
a return of the sale of real property, which fails 
to show that no personal property could be found 
out of which the judgment could be made, void 
on its face. On the contrary, such a return is 
good as against any form of attack other than 
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direct assault. Freeman on Executions (3d Ed.), 
Sec. 279." 
Oliver v. Dougherty, 8 Arizona 65; 68 Pac. 553, 
was a collateral assault on a sheriff's sale on execution 
by way of an action to quiet title. An Arizona statute 
provided that the writ of execution must require the 
officer to satisfy the judgment out of personal property 
of the debtor before resorting to his real property. It 
was claimed the sheriff did not conform to the mandates 
of this statute. The court answered this contention as 
follows: 
"* * * Such a provision incorporated in an 
execution according to the requirements of a 
statute is but a direction to the sheriff, and it 
is such a direction as the judgment debtor may 
require him to comply with before sale. It no-
where appears in the evidence that Oliver made 
any such demand. The appellants offered evi-
dence to show that, at the time the execution was 
levied and the sale was made, Oliver had personal 
property, which offer was denied by the court, 
and we think properly. There was no offer to 
show that Oliver had made a demand upon the 
sheriff that the sheriff refused, and that the 
purchaser at the sale knew of all those conditions, 
but it was for the first time to show that the judg-
ment debtor had property. Whether he had ample 
personal property to satisfy the judgment, or 
not, cannot affect the title of an innocent pur-
chaser. If the sheriff was executing the writ not 
in conformity with its terms, and was either 
ignorant of the fact that the judgment debtor 
held personal property, or, being aware of it, 
was purposely avoiding his duty, it was the right 
and it became the duty of the judgment debtor 
33 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
to call the attention of the sheriff to the fact 
that he had personal property, and that he was 
willing to turn it over for that purpose, and, if 
he refused to do so, to compel him by proper 
processes to first make the money out of the 
personal property which the judgment debtor 
was turning over to him. If the judgment debtor 
neglected to so protect himself, and permitted 
the sheriff to proceed to sell real estate, the sale 
is valid, especially where there is an innocent 
purchaser. With the evidence as it stood on the 
record, the court was justified in refusing to 
admit evidence of the existence of personal prop-
erty." 
Bauer v. Hertweck, 175 Cal. 278; 165 Pac. 946, was 
an action wherein a judgment debtor attempted to quiet 
title to real property against a purchaser at an execu-
tion sale on a judgment entered against plaintiff. He 
contended that neither the judgment plaintiff, sheriff 
nor execution sale purchaser notified him of the proposed 
sale. In overruling this contention the court said: 
"But there was no obligation upon them to 
give him any such notice. The statute defines how 
notice of an execution sale must be given. To 
say that a sale may be set aside because some 
other notice was not given would be to amend 
the statute, and this we cannot, of course, do. 
When the officer conducting the sale has done 
the acts prescribed by the Code, he has done 
his full duty. He is not required to search for 
the debtor and give him any further notice than 
that which the law exacts. Nor is any such duty 
imposed upon the judgment creditor." 
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With respect to inadequacy of consideration as a 
grounds for nullifying a sheriff's sale on collateral 
attack after issuance of the sheriff's deed the following 
statement by Judge Story is most pertinent: 
"* * * Inadequacy of consideration is not of 
itself a distinct principle of relief in equity. 
The common law knows no such principle. The 
consideration be it more or less supports the con-
tract. Common sense knows no such principle. 
The value of a thing is what it will produce, and 
admits no precise standard. If courts of equity 
were to unravel all these transactions they would 
throw everything into confusion and set afloat 
the contracts of mankind. Such a consequence 
would of itself, be sufficient to show the incon-
venience and impracticability, if not injustice, 
of adopting the doctrine that mere inadequacy 
of consideration should form a distinct ground 
of relief." (1 Story's Equity Jurisprudence, Sec. 
245). 
The appellant Dowse cites the following additional 
authorities as sustaining the legal principles herein 
asserted by him to be applicable in the instant case: 
1. Irregularities in conduct of execution sale which do 
not void the sale cannot be asserted, by a judgment 
debtor in an independent action collaterally attack-
ing the sale and seeking to quiet title against the 
sheriff's deed after period of redemption has ex-
pired and sheriff's deed has issued to the purchaser: 
Bird v. Kitchens, Ark ; 221 S.W. (2d) 
795; 
Gross v. Simsack, 364 Pa. 337; 72 Atl. (2d) 
103; 
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Knox v. Noggle, 279 Pa. 302; 196 Atl. (2d) 118; 
Bonner v. Lockhart, 236 Ala. 171; 181 South. 
767; 
Horkan v. Eason, 10 Ga. App. 236; 73 S.E. 
352; 
Dixon v. Peacock, 30 Okla. 87; 141 Pac. 429; 
Sheehan v. All Person, etc., 80 Cal. App. 393; 
252 Pac. 337; 
Sellers v. Johnson, 207 Ga. 644; 63 S.E. (2d) 
904; 
White v. Adams, 52 Cal. 435; 1 Pac. States. 
Rep. 435; 
Hamilton v. Waters, 93 Cal. App. 866; 210 
Pac. (2d) 67. 
2. Inadequacy of consideration or of bid price at an 
execution sale, in absence of proof of acts of over-
reaching or bad faith on the part of a judgment 
creditor, is not a valid ground to nullify the execu-
tion sale and cancel the sheriff's deed issued pur-
suant thereto in an independent collateral action 
instituted by the judgment debtor subsequent to the 
issuance of the deed. 
Knox v. Noggle, supra; 
Gross v. Simsack, supra; 
H.O.L.C. v. Edwards, 329 Pa. 529; 198 Atl. 123, 
124; 
Sellers v. Johnson, supra; 
Sikes et al. v. Beaver, et al., Sup. Ct. Ga. 
; 157 S.E. 467; 
City of Sanford v. Ashton, 131 Fla. 759; 179 
South 765; 
Solomon v. Neubrecht, 300 Mich. 177; 1 N.W. 
(2d) 501; 
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Lawyers Co-op. Publ. Co. v. Bennett, 34 Fla. 
302; 16 South 185; 
Sellers v. Johnson, 207 Ga. 644; 63 S.E. (2d) 
904; 
Marr v. Marr, 73 N.J. Eq. 643; 70 Atl. 375; 
McAlvay v. Consumers Salt Co., 112 Cal. App. 
383; 297 Pac. 135; 
Bauer v. Hertweck, 175 Cal. 278; 165 Pac. 946; 
Pavlovich v. Watts, 46 Cal. App. 103; 115 Pac. 
(2d) 511; 
Dewey v. Loomis, 113 Kan. 750; 216 Pac. 271; 
Elliott &. Healy v. Wirth, 34 Idaho 797; 198 
Pac. 757; 
McLain Land & Investment Co. v. Swofford 
Bros. Drv Goods, 11 Okla. 429; 68 Pac. 
502; 
Dickinson-Beed-Banderson Co. et al. v. Mark-
ley, 117 Okla. 17,244 Pac. 754; 
St. Paul Trust & Savings Bank v. Olson, 52 
N.D. 315;202N.W. 472; 
Burton v. Kipp, 30 Mont. 275; 76 Pac. 563. 
3. The objection that land was not offered for sale in 
separate parcels by the sheriff at an execution sale 
cannot be asserted in an independent action seeking 
to set aside the sale instituted after the sheriff's 
deed has issued to the purchaser at such sale. 
Baymond v. Halborn, 23 Wis. 57; 
Coulters v. Meiggs, 58 B.I. 30; 191 Atl. 115; 
Beed v. Gourley, Tex. C.A ; 109 S.W. 
(2d) 242. 
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4. A sale of real property on execution is not void 
because the sheriff failed to satisfy the judgment 
out of unexempt personal property of the judgment 
debtor before resorting to real property of the 
debtor and such irregularity is not a ground to nul-
lify the sale on a collateral attack thereon in an 
independent action. Such irregularity can only be 
asserted in a direct assault by way of motion to set 
aside the sale. 
Solomon v. Neubrecht, supra; 
Clark v. Fell, 139 Pa. 469; 22 Atl. 649; 
Smith v. Bandall, supra; 
Jacobsen v. Wigen, 52 Minn. 6; 53 N.W. 1016. 
5. Where, as in Utah, neither a legislative enactment 
nor Rules of Civil Procedure require that the judg-
ment creditor or the sheriff give personal notice of 
a proposed execution sale to a judgment debtor, the 
absence of such notice is no ground upon which to 
nullify the sale. 
Bock v. Losekamp, 179 Cal. 674; 179 Pac. 516; 
Mortimer v. Young, 53 Cal. App. (2d) 317; 127 
Pac. (2d) 950. 
The foregoing authorities clearly teach 
(a) that the provision of Kule 69 (b) U.R.C.P. re-
quiring the sheriff to satisfy the judgment out 
of personal property and if sufficient personal 
property cannot be found then out of the debt-
or's real property, is directory only and not 
mandatory. Violation of this rule and of the 
directions of the writ may be a ground for set-
ting aside the sale on direct attack but never 
on collateral attack. 
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(b) Likewise under Eule 69 (e) (1) defect in the 
notice of sale is voidable only on motion to set 
aside the same and is not a defect which affords 
relief in a collateral action to quiet title. 
(c) The requirement of rule 69 (e) (3) that when the 
sale of real property consisting of several known 
lots or parcels that they must be sold separately 
when the judgment creditor is present at the 
sale and directs the order of sale is directory 
and a violation of same does not afford relief 
except on a direct motion to set aside the sale. 
It is unavailable to the debtor in a subsequent 
action to quiet title. 
(d) That there is no duty upon either the sheriff 
conducting an execution sale or the judgment 
creditor to give personal notice to or otherwise 
notify him of the proposed execution sale. 
A summation of the whole matter is found in 23 C.J. 
693, 694, Sec. 691, as follows: 
"* * * On the other hand, if the defect or 
irregularity relied on, whether occurring before 
the sale, or in the conduct of the sale, makes the 
writ, levy, or sale merely voidable and not void, 
it cannot be urged by way of a collateral attack, 
but only on a motion to set it aside or in a direct 
action instituted for that purpose; and this is 
particularly true after the sale has been confirm-
ed. For instance, the want of proper notice of 
sale is not ground for a collateral attack on the 
sale, as against an innocent purchaser, especially 
after confirmation and a finding that due notice 
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of the sale was given. So it cannot be urged col-
laterally that the sale was en masse instead of 
in parcels, or that the price for which the property 
was sold was inadequate." 
An elaborate annotation demonstrating that execu-
tion sales en masse instead of in several parcels are 
merely voidable and that inadequacy of price cannot be 
collaterally attacked but relief must be by way of motion 
to set aside the sale and recall the sheriff's certificate 
of sale and deed is set forth in 1 A.L.R. 1442, 1443. 
It is manifest that when measured against the above 
elucidated legal background that much of the testimony 
submitted by the Respondent at the trial and admitted 
in evidence by the court was entirely irrelevant and 
immaterial on the issues of (1) irregularities in the con-
duct of the execution sale; (2) inadequacy of considera-
tion or bid price; (3) sale of land en masse; (4) failure 
to satisfy judgment out of unexempt personal property, 
and (5) absence of personal notice of the sale to Re-
spondent. The court committed gross error in admitting 
and considering the same upon these issues. This evi-
dence runs through the entire case. The Appellant 
Dowse here invites attention to examples of this type 
of inadmissible evidence. There is the testimony of the 
witness, Backman (with included exhibits) (R, 72-76) 
which attempts to prove that the land levied on was 
composed of four separate parcels. The testimony of 
the witness, LeCheminant (R. 77-78) which was directed 
to the question of excessive levy. The testimony of 
Respondent Pender (R. 104-117), wherein an attempt 
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was made to prove that he had available personal prop-
erty upon which the levy could have been made and his 
lack of knowledge of time and place of sale is another 
example of this type of immaterial and irrelevant evi-
dence. The testimony of Larch, one of Respondent's 
witnesses (R. 118-128) was also directed towards the 
proof of the existence of personal property of the Re-
spondent upon which the writ of execution could have 
been levied. The testimony of Deputy Sheriff Bleak (R. 
136-144) pertaining to the method of the conduct of the 
sheriff's sale was not only inadmissible on these issues 
but was an attempt to impeach the sale in a collateral 
attack. 
Without burdening this brief with a further detailed 
reference to this type of inadmissible evidence the 
Appellant Dowse contends that the action of the court 
in admitting it was error which highly prejudiced his 
rights in this case. 
As a direct consequence of the trial court admitting 
and considering irrelevant and immaterial evidence of 
the nature hereinabove immediately described the court 
also committed serious error prejudicial to Dowse in 
making the following Findings of Fact: 
10. (Pertaining to the existence of personal prop-
erty belonging to Pender of sufficient value to 
satisfy the judgment) R. 241; 
11. (Determining that the real property consisted 
of four non-contiguous parcels of land) R. 
242; 
12. (Attempting to fix the value of the land levied 
upon) R. 242; 
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13. (That the real property was sold en masse) 
B. 242; 
14. (That plaintiff had no actual notice of the 
levy and execution sale) (B. 242-243; 
15. (That the levy was excessive and bid price 
inadequate) R. 243; 
16. (The existence of personal property of 
Pender upon which levy could have been 
made) R. 243. 
Therefore, on this facet of the case the appellant 
Dowse asserts and vigorously contends that the trial 
court committed error most prejudicial to him. First, 
in admitting irrelevant and immaterial evidence on the 
five issues above enumerated, and, secondly, in making 
the findings of fact above enumerated based upon this 
inadmissible evidence. 
n. 
WHETHER THE EXECUTION AND DELIVERY BY 
PENDER UNTO DORIS TRUST COMPANY, A COR-
PORATION, OF THE QUIT CLAIM DEED DATED JULY 
22, 1949 (EX. J), EFFECTED A SATISFACTION AND 
DISCHARGE OF THE JUDGMENT FOR $22.80 IN 
FAVOR OF DOWSE ENTERED IN ACTION 86,895, AND 
UPON WHICH THE WRIT OF EXECUTION WAS 
ISSUED? 
Dowse instituted and prosecuted an action against 
Pender in the Third District Court designated as action 
86,895, wherein Dowse sought to quiet title against 
Pender to Lots 18 and 19, Block 1, North Columbia 
Subdivision and also to collect damages from Pender 
for slander of title (R. 59). 
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This action resulted in a judgment dated November 
4, 1949, quieting title in Dowse as against Pender in and 
to said land and awarding to Dowse his costs therein 
(Exhibit A). It was upon this judgment that writ of 
execution was issued (Exhibit H). Thereafter on Novem-
ber 29, 1949 Pender delivered a deed in favor of Doris 
Trust Company quit-claiming said real property (Ex-
hibit J ) . This deed, however, was dated July 22, 1949. 
Two of the issues of fact to be determined at trial as 
set forth in the pretrial order (R. 34-35) were: 
"4. Did S. W. Dowse agree to satisfy the judg-
ment in connection with the transaction 
wherein he paid $100.00 to Rennold Pender 
and received a quit claim deed from Pender? 
5. Did Rennold Pender agree to forego an 
appeal in case 86,895 in connection with the 
transaction mentioned in paragraph 4 above." 
By Finding of Fact 7 (R. 241) the court found: 
"That on November 29, 1949, the said Ren-
nold Pender upon the solicitation and request of 
S. W. Dowse and in consideration of the payment 
by S. W. Dowse to Rennold Pender of $100.00 
executed and delivered to said S. W. Dowse a quit 
claim deed to the property involved in Civil 
Action 86,895. That it was agreed between the 
said S. W. Dowse and Rennold Pender that said 
transaction was to settle all differences arising in 
and out of said case, Civil No. 86,895, and to 
terminate the said Rennold Pender's right of 
appeal from the judgment entered therein." 
Dowse contends that the part of said finding read-
ing as follows: 
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"* * * to settle all differences arising in and 
out of said case, Civil No. 86,895, and * * *" 
is clearly erroneous and is not supported by the evidence 
in this case. With this quoted phrase eliminated from 
the finding it will be correct inasmuch as it will then 
determine that the purpose of the quit claim deed men-
tioned in said finding was to terminate Pender's right 
of appeal from the judgment entered against him in said 
case and not satisfy the judgment for costs against him. 
It is important to determine the consequences of 
Pender executing and delivering the quit claim deed 
(Exhibit J) and of Dowse's acceptance of same. A court 
in adjudicating the effect of a quit claim deed in cir-
cumstances similar to those of the instant case will look 
into the intent of the parties as shown by evidence of the 
surrounding facts and circumstances. If such evidence 
shows that the parties intended a specific purpose by the 
use of said quit claim deed said intention will be recog-
nized and made effective. The case of Chesney v. Valley 
Live Stock Co., 34 Wyo. 378; 244 Pac. 216, 44 A.L.R. 
1255, illustrates this principle. In that case a quit claim 
deed was given by a mortgagee to the owner of the mort-
gaged property who had assumed and agreed to pay 
the mortgage. It was contended by the property owner 
and its judgment creditors junior to the mortgage that 
the quit claim deed released the mortgage. The court 
examined into the circumstances of the giving of the 
deed and concluded: 
"While it is possibly true that a quitclaim 
deed from a mortgagee to the mortgagor or his 
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assignee, of the mortgaged premises, is prima 
facie a release and satisfaction of the mortgage 
lien * * * the court will look into the intent of 
the parties, and if the intent is not to release 
the mortgage, that intent will prevail * * *." 
The cases of Ckausse v. Bank of Garland, supra, 
and O'Reilley v. McLean, 84 Ut. 551, 37 Pac. (2d) 770, 
reaffirmed the rule that the effect of a quit claim deed 
is dependent upon the intention of the parties thereto 
and that the court will examine into the facts and cir-
cumstances surrounding the giving of said deed to de-
termine this intention. 
Exhibit "J," being the quit claim deed from Pender 
to Doris Trust Company, is dated July 22, 1949, but 
was not recorded until November 29, 1949. The judg-
ment in action 89,895 was dated and filed on November 
4, 1949. Backman, the attorney for Pender in action 
89,895, stated in the present case as follows (R. 92): 
"Q. I note this Exhibit "J" is dated July 22, 1949, 
but not recorded until November 29, 1949, 
had that been in your file all the time from 
the time of its execution in July until final 
payment on its delivery of this $100.00 pay-
ment? 
"A. As I recall I had Mr. Pender sign the deed 
in July, and I think at that time there were 
some negotiations on the part of Mr. Steiner 
for this property which is here described and 
that could have been in fact this deed which 
you have reference to. 
"Q. Exhibit "J"? 
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"A. Could have been the deed that was delivered 
to Mr. Duncan at the time he paid the $100.00, 
in 1950, that is just possible. 
"Q. You mean November of 1949? 
"A. No, in 1950. 
"Q. I show you the recording date on this. 
"A. Yes, November of 1949, thank you, Mr. Pugs-
ley.'' 
Further, Backman testified that in a street encounter 
with Duncan, attorney for Dowse in action 86,895, after 
the judgment was entered, Duncan inquired of Backman 
if Backman could secure a quit claim deed from Pender 
to the property involved in that action and offered to 
pay Pender $100.00 consideration (R. 63). Backman 
admitted that Duncan informed him that Dowse wanted 
a quit claim deed to cut off the appeal period because 
Dowse had a deal pending with a Mr. West, an attorney 
(R. 63-64). Backman promised to contact Pender. Later 
Backman informed Duncan that Pender had authorized 
Backman to deliver a quit claim to the property and had 
executed a deed for delivery to Duncan or to whomever 
he directed (R. 64). The name of the grantee was left 
blank in the deed (R. 64). Backman at first denied that 
Exhibit " J " was the deed delivered to Duncan for the 
sum of $100.00 (R. 64-65) but thereafter in his exam-
ination by Mr. Pugsley, above quoted, apparently cor-
rected his testimony. According to Backman, Duncan 
called at his office, paid the $100.00 and "picked up the 
deed" (R. 65). Backman also stated that in his conver-
sations with Duncan that nothing was said concerning 
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the cost judgment against Pender (E. 66). In October 
or November Backman first learned that the execution 
sale had been held and after the delivery of the sheriff's 
deed he interviewed Duncan (E. 68) and questioned him 
as to the cost judgment asserting that he informed 
Duncan that when he delivered the quit claim deed (Ex-
hibit "J") to Duncan and Duncan paid the $100.00 that 
he, Backman, assumed that if Dowse was going to press 
the cost judgment something would have been said about 
it or the amount would have been deducted from the 
$100.00 (E. 68). Backman claimed that Duncan asserted 
that he could not explain the transaction and asserted 
that it was a mistake and that he, Duncan, knew nothing 
of the cost bill (E. 68). 
Duncan explains the anomaly of Exhibit " J" being 
dated in July, 1949, as follows (E. 178-179): 
"A. This was prepared in July of 1949, July 
22nd, or 1949 at the time Mr. Pender had 
placed a deed on the record to Lots 18 and 
19, Block 1, North Columbia Subdivision, 
which was then in the name of Mr. Steiner, 
who was acting for Mr. Dowse, as I recall 
I talked to — I think I wrote a letter to Mr. 
Pender and in response to the letter, Mr. 
Backman called me and said he would take 
the deed off for $250.00. Now, I might ex-
plain at the same time that the same grantor, 
that Mr. Steiner, for Mr. Dowse had pur-
chased this property, owned another piece of 
property in the north part of the city and 
Mr. Dowse sold that piece to Mr. Pender for 
$250.00, and that Mr. Backman said he didn't 
think we had the right grantor because there 
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was an elderly woman that lived in Los Ange-
les. I said if there is any doubt, question 
about that, to give us our $250.00 back and 
we will give you the deeds to both pieces. 
He said he wouldn't give us anything back. 
He wanted $250.00 to take this deed off placed 
on the record subsequent to our deed to this 
property, Lots 18 and 19, Block 1, North 
Columbia Sub-division. 
"Q. After that time, did the trial of the case 
86,895, S.W. Dowse v. Kennold Pender go for-
ward? 
"A. Yes it did." 
As to the delivery of Exhibit " J" in consideration 
of the payment of $100.00 Duncan testified as follows 
(R. 180-182): 
"A. Well, as I recall, from refreshing my recol-
lections here, it was on the 9th of November, 
cost bill was filed and by the decree our title 
was quieted to that property and we had a 
sale of it; we were negotiating a sale with 
Mr. David West, who represented the pur-
chaser, and Mr. West—the sale was help 
(sic) up—I think the purchasers were repre-
sented by both Mr. West and Mr. Wilde, and 
Mr. Wilde had testified that the transaction 
was still alive, his client would still pay 
$10,000.00 for the property if the title were 
quieted and it was on that basis Judge 
Hogensen ruled we hadn't proved any slander 
of title. After we got to this transaction, 
after the trial, and Judge Hogensen had 
quieted title, I had drawn the Findings and 
so forth, I completed my negotiations, but 
Mr. West and Mr. Wilde did not want to go 
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further until they were certain that the time 
for appeal had been terminated, and at that 
time, of course, it was 90 days, and I went to 
Mr. Backman and asked him if he intended 
to appeal. He said 'no.' And I said, "Will 
you give us a quit claim deed or any other 
consideration, we waived the right to appeal." 
He said, "You are going to make something 
out of this, I think you ought to give me 
$100.00." He said, "I still have the deed you 
were talking about last July." 
"Q. Is that the deed, Exhibit "J," in your hands % 
"A. Yes, I paid the $100.00 to him, as he testified, 
and I think I indicated to him at that time 
it was a shake down, but I paid it. * * * 
"Q. (By Mr. Pugsley) At the time of the pay-
ment of $100.00 and delivery of the deed to 
you, was there any discussion between you 
and Mr. Backman with respect to a cost bill 
previously served and his office % 
"A. None whatever. 
"Q. Was it your intention in paying that $100.00 
to settle that cost judgment % * * * 
"A. None whatever, all I was doing was cutting 
off his right to appeal as indicated. 
"Q. Were you ever authorized by Mr. Dowse, 
your client, to satisfy that cost judgment? 
"A. No, sir." 
Duncan further testified that he had a conference 
with Backman in Duncan's office after the sheriff's deed 
had issued wherein Backman asked the reason for taking 
cost judgment. At that time Backman stated he over-
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looked the costs and he understood Dowse had a judg-
ment for same. Duncan informed him that he not only 
had the judgment but a sheriff's deed had been issued. 
Backman desired to know what could be done about it. 
Duncan said he would recommend to Dowse that if 
Pender would pay the cost judgment and the sheriff's 
additional costs on sale, for Dowse to quit claim the 
property to Pender (K. 186-187). Backman replied that 
he would talk to his client and left Duncan's office (R. 
187). Some time later Backman returned and informed 
Duncan that he thought that Duncan should give a deed 
because he (Dowse) had paid this $100.00. Duncan 
denied that he had ever informed Backman that the 
cost judgment was a mistake (E. 187) and denied that 
there was any mistake in serving and filing the cost bill 
(R. 188). Duncan declared on cross-examination that at 
the time he paid the $100.00 at Backman's office he said 
nothing about the cost judgment (R. 189). 
It is from this evidence that the intent of the parties 
must be determined. 
Did Dowse pay the $100.00 and accept the deed for 
the purpose only of foreclosing Pender's appeal time of 
90 days or did the giving of the quit claim deed by 
Pender and the payment of the $100.00 by Dowse effect 
a complete settlement and compromise of the action? 
Backman admits that at no time in the negotiations 
with Duncan prior to the issuance of the sheriff's deed 
was anything said of the cost judgment. There is not a 
line of evidence in the case that Pender required not 
only the payment of the $100.00 but also a satisfaction 
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of the judgment as the price of the quit claim deed. 
Backman acknowledged receipt of copy of the judgment 
which carried costs to Dowse. He also admitted that the 
cost bill had been duly received in his office and that he 
took no action either to amend the judgment or to strike 
the cost bill. During the entire period of redemption 
he remained silent and it was only after the issuance of 
the sheriff's deed did he raise a question as to the judg-
ment for costs. Dowse had a buyer of the property soon 
after the entry of the judgment quieting title in him. 
In order to make his sale it was incumbent upon him to 
make the judgment final. It was for this reason that 
he desired, acting through Duncan, to secure from 
Pender a waiver of the right of appeal. He therefore 
asked for this quit claim deed. Pender exacted the sum 
of $100.00 for the deed but neither he nor his attorney, 
Backman, said anything about the cost judgment although 
there was obvious evidence of its existence in Backman's 
office. This situation which is implicit in both Backman's 
and Duncan's testimony makes certain that Pender gave 
the deed and accepted the sum of $100.00 and Dowse 
accepted the deed with the intent of terminating imme-
diately Pender's right of appeal and not as a final and 
complete settlement of the action. At the time the deed 
was given and the consideration paid the parties through 
their attorneys talked only of ending Pender's right of 
appeal. Backman admits this in his testimony and Dun-
can positively affirms it. This is a case of a judgment 
creditor paying a consideration to his judgment debtor 
for a deed and with both parties remaining silent as 
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to the disposition of the cost judgment. It is difficult, 
almost impossible, to deduce from this situation the con-
clusion that the transaction was a complete compromise 
and settlement. Bather, it confirms Duncan's testimony 
that he paid the $100.00 for Dowse and Pender delivered 
the deed only for the purpose of securing from Pender 
a waiver of his right of appeal. The cost judgment was 
not taken into consideration in the negotiations and 
transaction and stood outside of the deal. This inter-
pretation of the evidence reconciles any differences be-
tween the versions of Backman and Duncan, and makes 
the testimony of these two witnesses consistent. It leads 
to the conclusion that the cost judgment remained an 
obligation of Pender's and there was available to Dowse 
all the remedies to enforce the judgment granted by 
law. The truth of the transaction is although having 
due notice of the existence of this cost judgment, Pender 
and Backman in addition to demanding $100.00 for the 
deed failed to exact from Dowse a release of the judg-
ment. At no place in the evidence is there any sug-
gestion that Pender exacted from Dowse $100.00 and 
a full release of the judgment. It was an after-thought, 
purely and simply, that the consideration for the quit 
claim deed was the sum of $100.00 and the release of 
the judgment. The conclusion is that the part of finding 
7, "to settle all differences arising in and out of said 
case Civil No. 86,895, and" is clearly erroneous and is 
not supported by any evidence in this case. Oppositely, 
the evidence does sustain that part of the finding "that 
the said transaction was * # * to terminate the said 
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Rennold Pender's right of appeal from the judgment 
entered therein." (R. 241). Therefore, prejudicial error 
was committed by the trial court by including in finding 
7 the conclusion that the quit claim deed was delivered 
by Pender and the $100.00 paid by Dowse to him to 
compromise and settle the case. 
III. 
WHETHER DOWSE PRACTICED ANY FRAUD-
ULENT DEVICES UPON PENDER IN INITIATING THE 
SHERIFFS SALE AND ACQUIRING THE REAL PROP-
ERTY LEVIED UPON WHICH ENTITLES PENDER TO 
EQUITABLE RELIEF IN A COLLATERAL ACTION 
ATTACKING THE VALIDITY OF THE SHERIFF'S SALE 
AND SEEKING CANCELLATION OF THE DEED IS-
SUED BY THE SHERIFF TO DOWSE? 
Finding 17 reads as follows: 
"17. That the praecipe delivered to the 
sheriff by said defendant S. W. Dowse instructed 
the sheriff to sell other real property belonging 
to plaintiff than that executed and levied upon. 
That the same was stricken from the praecipe at 
the request of the sheriff. That the execution 
and levy so directed to be made by defendant 
S. W. Dowse, was not made to satisfy a valid 
existing judgment, but the same was a par t of 
a conspiracy on the par t of said defendant S. W. 
Dowse to deprive plaintiff of his property and 
to unlawfully obtain title thereto and i t was a 
fraud upon plaintiff." (R. 243). 
By the above finding the court attempted to charge 
Dowse with collusion and fraud in causing the writ to 
issue on the judgment in his favor and in bidding in 
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the real property levied upon by the sheriff at the public 
sale. As has been clearly demonstrated, irregularities 
of the sheriff's sale of the nature hereinabove discussed 
do not constitute fraud. The court cannot consolidate 
a series of such irregularities and find therefrom that 
thus cumulated they constitute such fraud, overreaching 
or sharp practice by the judgment creditor as to justify 
the court in nullifying the sheriff's sale. The following 
quotation from Victor Inv. Co. v. Roerig, supra, is much 
in point; 
"It was concluded as matter of law (1) 'that 
inadequacy of price is not within itself sufficient 
to warrant the setting aside of the sale'; and (2) 
'that the circumstances of unfairness proven are 
not alone sufficient to invalidate the sale'; but 
(3) that the two elements combined were sufficient 
to justify the decree. * * * It is believed that 
nothing less than collusion between the officer and 
the purchaser would justify the cancellation of 
the sheriff's deed for the irregularity in making 
the levy." 
Fraud or overreaching by a judgment creditor which 
will authorize a nullification of the sheriff's sale on col-
lateral attack must be of the nature that the court may 
find that the judgment debtor has been under some kind 
of legal or other restraint which has prevented him 
from attending the sale by inducements or circumstances 
of a fraudulent character at the instance of the judg-
ment creditor or the purchaser at such sale. (McLain 
Land & Investment Company v. Swofford Bros. Dry 
Goods Company, supra), or the proof must show that 
there was collusion between the sheriff and the judg-
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ment creditor or purchaser. (Myers v. Sanders, 7 Dana 
(Ky.) 507; Hill v. Whitfield, 48 N.C. 120). 
The evidence in this case exculpates Deputy Sheriff 
Bleak from any wrong-doing or collusion with Dowse 
or his attorney Duncan. There was not even a sugges-
tion throughout the trial of the case that this public 
officer was guilty of any misconduct in violation of his 
oath. Any charge of collusion between Bleak and Dowse 
or Duncan must be put out of the case. 
Did Dowse or Duncan engage in any act which in-
duced Pender to remain away from the sheriff's sale or 
did they pursue a course of conduct which lulled him 
into security? The authorities hereinbefore cited show 
beyond any dispute that there was no duty on Bleak, 
the deputy sheriff, Dowse or Duncan to notify Pender 
of the proposed sale. Pender was charged with knowl-
edge of the cost judgment against him, and that it might 
be executed upon. The evidence shows that he gave the 
quit claim deed (Exhibit "J") for the purpose only of 
waiving his right of appeal. It is impossible from this 
evidence to conclude that Dowse or his attorney Duncan 
deliberately and willfully prevented Pender from being 
present at the sale. Therefore the elements which char-
acterized the conduct of the judgment creditor and its 
counsel in Young vs. Schroeder, 10 Ut. 155, 37 Pac. 252, 
161 U.S. 334, 40 Law. Ed. 721,16 Sup. Ct. 512, is entirely 
missing in this case. In the Young case counsel for the 
judgment creditor not only was the bidder at the sale 
but had informed Young that the statutory time for 
redemption would not be insisted upon and thereupon 
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Young permitted the period for redemption to elapse 
without making redemption. Therefore, there is elim-
inated from consideration in this case the question as 
to whether Dowse or Duncan took any action which 
induced Pender to remain away from the sale and to 
fail to exercise his right of redemption. The evidence 
beyond controversy exculpates them from wrong-doing 
in this regard. 
As to inadequacy of the bid price at the sheriff's 
sale it is interesting to analyze the status of the title 
to the various parcels of land, all in North Columbia 
Subdivision, sold at the execution sale. 
Lots 6 and 7, Block 4 were subject to (a) a special 
tax sale for paving extension 79 in the amount 
of $35.15, costs and interest; (b) a tax sale 
to Salt Lake County for general taxes for the 
years 1928 to 1935, in an approximate gross 
amount of $220.00, plus interest and costs 
upon which a tax deed had issued to Salt 
Lake County; and (c) a judgment against 
Pender in favor of Freeman in the sum of 
$13.20. (Exhibit "E"). 
Lots 2 and 3, Block 4, were subject to the afore-
said judgment in favor of Freeman for $13.20. 
(Exhibit "D"). 
Lots 1, 19 and 20, Block 6, were subject to the 
aforesaid Freeman judgment for $13.20. (Ex-
hibit "B"). 
Lots 2, 3 and 4, Block 8 were subject to (a) the 
Freeman judgment of $13.20; and (b) a tax 
sale to Salt Lake County for $171.86 for 1949 
taxes (thereafter redeemed by Dowse). (Ex-
hibit "F"). 
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Lots 13 to 21, Block 8, were subject to (a) the 
Freeman judgment in the amount of $13.20; 
(b) two tax sales to Salt Lake County for 
1949 taxes of $12.48 and $24.29, respectively 
(thereafter redeemed by Dowse); and (c) 
judgment lien in favor of Carl Morandi for 
$3,086.44. (Exhibit "C"). 
The testimony of witness LeCheminant as an expert 
on real property values is of little importance because 
he insisted that his opinion was based upon good market* 
able title (R. 84) and that the values were fair market 
values in ordinary commercial sales. He was not testify-
ing as to the value of property at a forced sale on 
execution. 
The Colorado Supreme Court in Victor Inv. Co. v. 
Roerig, supra, quoted from Watt v. McGalliard, 67 111. 
513, as follows: 
"At judicial sales, where there is a redemp-
tion, it is a well-known fact that lands, unless 
where necessary to secure the debt, are rarely 
sold at anything approximating their real value. 
Such purchases are not looked upon as a desir-
able mode of investment. There is seldom com-
petition. The creditor, for the most part, has 
to take the land in satisfaction of his debt and 
wait for it to be redeemed. * * *" 
When the conduct of Dowse and Duncan is subjected 
to microscopic examination there is no parallel with 
the conduct of the judgment creditor and its counsel in 
the Young case, supra. After Duncan paid the $100.00 
to Backman and received the quit claim deed to the 
property involved in action 86,895 there was no contact 
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between Pender and Dowse or between Duncan and 
Backman relative to the instant case until Backman 
learned of the sheriff's sale and contacted Duncan and 
went to the latter's office. The parties were dealing at 
arms length. Pender faced the hazard of a writ of exe-
cution on this judgment against him. He took no action 
either before the writ was executed or during the period 
of redemption. It was through his own carelessness and 
neglect that his property was subjected to execution 
sale. The situation called for affirmative action on Pen-
der's part to protect his property. He was under no 
restraint imposed by Dowse or Duncan. He remained 
inactive at his peril. Dowse was under no compulsion 
to refrain from pursuing his legal remedies. 
A fair analysis of the conduct of Dowse and Duncan 
must compel a conclusion that neither of them were 
guilty of fraud or overreaching which would nullify the 
sheriff's sale. One cannot be guilty of fraud by doing 
what he has a legal right to do and courts will not inquire 
into motives for doing a lawful act. (Prudential Insur-
ance Company of America v. Bohlken, 40 Fed. Supp. 494 ; 
Owens v. Owens, 347 Mo. 80, 146 S.W. (2d) 569; Yoder 
v. Givens, 179 Va, 229, 18 S.E. (2d) 380). Therefore, 
one must conclude that Finding 17 is without substantial 
evidence to support it. 
There is an absurd statement contained in this find-
ing concerning which comment should be made. It is 
declared that the execution and levy directed by Dowse 
"was a part of a conspiracy on the part of the defendant 
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S. W. Dowse to deprive plaintiff of his property.* * *" 
There is no necessity of discussing the law of conspiracy 
at length but it is most pertinent to remark that a man 
cannot conspire with himself. There must be two or more 
parties to a conspiracy. (15 CJ. Sec. 1, p. 996; Frost 
v. Hanscome, 198 Cal. 500, 246 Pac. 53; Moropoulos v. 
Fuller Company, 186 Cal. 679, 200 Pac. 601; Mclntire v. 
Chevrolet Motor Company, 115 Cal. App. 187, 1 Pac. 
(2d) 40; 11 Am. Jur. Conspiracy, Sec. 4, p. 544). There 
is no finding that Dowse and Bleak, the deputy sheriff, 
conspired together or that Dowse and Duncan conspired 
together or that Duncan and Bleak conspired together. 
As above stated the evidence exculpates Bleak from any 
wrongdoing to which a charge of conspiracy could be 
attached. As between Dowse and Duncan there is not a 
line of evidence that indicates any concerted action to 
accomplish an unlawful purpose or to accomplish some 
purpose not in itself unlawful by unlawful means. Dun-
can is securing the issuance of the writ of execution, 
delivering the praecipe to Bleak and making the bid 
at the sale for Dowse acted only as every attorney must 
act in like circumstances for his client who is a judgment 
creditor. To find such conduct by Duncan as a participa-
tion in a conspiracy with his client Dowse is to find that 
a lawyer is a conspirator in representing his client in 
litigation. Such finding would destroy the legal pro-
fession. This part of Finding 17 is not only not sup-
ported by the evidence but is manifestly without merit. 
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IV. 
WHETHER A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR SLANDER 
OR DISPARAGEMENT OF PROPERTY OR OF THE 
TITLE THERETO WAS ALLEGED AND PROVED IN 
THIS ACTION? 
Finding 9 is as follows: 
"9. That defendant S. W. Dowse, in causing 
execution to be issued and in levying upon the 
property of plaintiff and in causing the same 
to be sold at Sheriff's sale, and in purchasing 
the same at Sheriff's Sale acted maliciously in 
said matter and by such actions said defendant 
slandered the title of plaintiff to said property 
herein described." (B. 241). 
With respect to the elements of a cause of action 
for slander of title or disparagement of property the 
correct rule is stated as follows: 
"The rule is generally recognized that spe-
cial damage is a necessary element of a cause 
of action for slander of title or disparagement 
of goods or property, and that the special dam-
ages recoverable must be such as proximately 
flow from the slander uttered. According to some 
authorities, in order to show that the words utter-
ed in slander of title have caused injury or spe-
cial damage to the plaintiff, it is essential that 
they were uttered pending some negotiation or 
proceeding for the sale of the property, and that. 
thereby some intending purchaser was prevented 
from purchasing, bidding, or competing; and in 
any case where the loss of sale of a thing dis-
paraged is claimed and relied on as special dam-
ages occasioned by the disparagement, it is nec-
essary to show a loss of sale to some particular 
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person. * * *" (33 Am. Jur. Libel and Slander, 
Sec. 350, p. 314 and 315). 
The early case of Burkett v. Griffiths, 90 Cal. 532, 
27 Pac. 527, 13 L.R.A. 707, laid down the rule that an 
action for slander of title cannot be maintained for state-
ments causing the breach by a third person of a valid 
contract to purchase plaintiff's property. The court 
said: 
"In an action like the present, the plaintiff 
can recover only such damage as he may have 
sustained by reason of an intending purchaser 
being prevented from making the contract; but 
the complaint herein shows that whatever state-
ments or declarations were made by the defendant 
prior to the making of the contract did not have 
the effect to provent Sketchley from entering 
into the same, and those which he made there-
after have not caused the plaintiff any damage 
which can be said to have resulted therefrom. 
We know of no case in which it has been held 
that, when the plaintiff has a valid contract of 
sale, he can recover damages for its breach 
against one whose words, however false and 
malicious, have induced the other contracting 
party to violate such agreement." (13 L.R.A. 
710). 
In Gudger v. Manton, 21 Cal. (2d) 537, 134 Pac. 
(2d) 217, the California Supreme Court broadened the 
narrow doctrine of the Burkett case, supra, in the fol-
lowing language: 
"In Burkett v. Griffith, supra, the court was 
not concerned with a recorded instrument affect-
ing the title. Further, it seemed persuaded that 
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where a binding contract exists between the pur-
chaser and plaintiff, and the disparaging matter 
induced the purchaser to breach his contract 
rather than preventing him from agreeing to 
purchase, the plaintiff had an adequate remedy 
against the purchaser. That reasoning is no 
longer valid inasmuch as an action will lie for 
inducing the breach of a contract by a resort 
to unlawful means such as libel or slander." 
The doctrine of the Gudger case, supra, was fol-
lowed in Baker v. Kale, 83 Cal App. (2d) 89, 189 Pac. 
(2d) 57, wherein it was held that one publishing with-
out a privilege to do so, publishes matter which is untrue 
and disparaging to another's property in land, under 
such circumstances as would lead a reasonable man to 
foresee that the conduct of a third as purchaser or 
lessee thereof might be determined by such publication 
he is guilty of slander of title. 
The Wyoming Supreme Court in Barquin v. Hall 
Oil Company, 28 Wyo. 164, 201 Pac. 352, 202 Pac. 1107, 
made the following pertinent statements: 
"Hence the special damages must be speci-
fically pointed out or the petition is demurrable. 
It is not sufficient to allege in general terms that 
the plaintiff has been damaged or that he has 
been prevented from making a sale; if the proper-
ty could have been sold for more than its value, 
or for more than it actually brought, the amount 
thereof must be stated and the parties must bo 
named. It is clear, therefore, that on this issue 
the pleadings of plaintiffs are not sufficient 
against a demurrer." (201 Pac. 354). 
"The facts showing how the special damages 
claimed arose must be stated (17 C.J. 1003) in 
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order to apprise the adverse party so as to put 
him in position to properly meet the question by 
opposite proof, if he has any. Hence, when plain-
tiff simply alleges that he has been damaged by 
reason of the failure to release the instruments of 
record without stating the facts upon which that 
loss is based and the amount thereof, the pleading 
is not merely indefinite, but in such case there 
is a total want of sufficient allegations." (202 Pac. 
1108). 
In the instant case Issue of Fact 12 contained in the 
Pretrial Order (E. 35) reads as follows: "Did S. W. 
Dowse slander the title of the realty described in para-
graph 1 of plaintiff's amended complaint by causing the 
same to be sold at sheriff's sale and to be mortgaged 
and sold to the other defendants in this action!" 
Plaintiff's amended complaint contains no allegation 
of special damages. There is no claim either (a) that 
an intending purchaser from Pender was prevented from 
making a contract to buy or from buying the land sold 
at the sheriff's sale (Burhett case, supra) or (b) that 
a third party purchaser of the land from Pender was 
induced to breach his contract {Gudger case, supra). 
Under the authorities a part of the cause of action are 
the special damages accruing to a plaintiff because of 
the defendant's malicious actions in disparaging the 
land of the title thereof. He must allege and prove 
either one or both elements (a) and (b) above which 
are constituent parts of his cause of action. If they are 
not alleged and proved no cause of action for slander 
of title exists. Pender did not prove that Dowse had 
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prevented a sale to a third person nor did he prove 
that Dowse caused a third party purchaser to breach 
a contract of purchase with Pender. Therefore, it ap-
pears beyond doubt that no cause of action for slander 
of title by Dowse existed in Pender's favor. Finding 9 
is not supported by the evidence and is an illegal, capri-
cious and wholly arbitrary finding by the court. Under 
all circumstances it should be annulled and set aside. 
It is obvious that this error permeated the judgment 
which allowed Pender $500.00 punitive damages and 
$1,000.00 attorney's fees. The court was confused and 
considered the allowance of punitive damages and attor-
ney's fees as the damages supported by Pender for slan-
der of title. Such award was clearly illegal because dam-
ages which are allowed a plaintiff for slander of title 
are special damages of the nature above described, 
V. 
WHETHER ATTORNEY'S FEES IN AN ACTION 
FOR SLANDER OF TITLE ARE ALLOWABLE? 
The right to recover attorney's fees from one's 
opponent in litigation as part of the costs thereof does 
not exist at common law. Such item of expense is not 
allowable in the absence of statute or of some agreement 
expressly authorizing the taxing of attorney's fees in 
addition to the ordinary statutory costs. The term 
"costs" or "expenses" does not ordinarily include attor-
ney's fees. 
"In the absence of contract, statute or recog-
nized ground of equity there is no inherent right 
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to have attorneys' fees paid by the opposing side." 
(Johnson v. Gerald, 216 Ala. 581, 113 So. 447, 
59A.L.R. 348). 
"With respect to the award of $200.00 for 
attorney fees as damages for depriving plaintiff 
of possession by writ of attachment, the judgment 
was clearly erroneous. There was no contract 
involved which authorized the award of counsel 
fees and and there was no basis for an award of 
punitive damages. See 15 Am. Jur. p. 551, 25 
C.J.S., Damages, Sec. 50, p. 531, and Drinkhouse 
v. Van Ness, 202 Cal. 359, 260 P. 869. Cf. St. 
Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. Love, 57 Utah 450, 
195 P. 305, 25 A.L.R. 569." (Dahl v. Prince, 
Utah ; 230 Pac. (2d) 1328). 
"Evidence was admitted, over the objection 
of intervener, as to expenses incurred by plain-
tiffs in pursuit of and for locating the horse prior 
to the commencement of the action, including 
$500.00 for the services of an attorney in that 
regard. Plaintiffs admit that the admission of 
the testimony constituted error, but contend that 
'the items were small, and apparently the jury 
gave no consideration thereto.' * * * In this case 
the amounts claimed to have been so spent were, 
no doubt, definitely fixed in the minds of the 
jurors and, in view of the court's instruction, we 
may safely assume that they included the entire 
amount of the $500.00 attorney's fees in their 
award of damages. For that reason the judgment 
against the defendant should be reduced by that 
amount," (Drinkhouse v. Van Ness, 202 Cal. 
359, 260 Pac. 869; See Beindorf v. Thorpe et al., 
126 Okla. 157, 259 Pac. 242, 55 A.L.E. 1014; 14 
Am. Jur. Costs Sec. 63, p. 38; Ann. 150 AL.E. 
720). 
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In the Barquin v. Hall Oil Company, supra, the 
Wyoming Supreme Court disallowed a claim for attor-
ney's fees. 
McGuinness v. Hargiss, 56 Wash. 162, 105 Pac. 233, 
contains the following statement: 
"Upon the second point submitted, we are of 
the opinion that the court below erred. In actions 
of slander of title it is the recognized rule that 
only special damages are recoverable, and that 
such damages must be pleaded and proved. 25 
Am. & Eng. Enc. Law. 1079; 25 Cyc. 561. There 
was no plea nor proof of special damage, except 
the claim for an attorney's fee for the prosecution 
of this action. We have uniformly held that in 
this state attorney's fees, either as damages or 
costs, other than statutory, are not recoverable. 
In Spencer v. Commercial Company, 36 Wash. 
374, 78 Pac. 914, the court attempts to forever 
settle the question by saying: 'It has been so often 
decided that the granting of attorney's fees in 
cases of this kind was error that it is no longer 
a proper subject for discussion.' " 
There is no statute in Utah authorizing the recovery 
of attorney's fees in a slander of title action. There was 
certainly no agreement of the parties hereto for the 
losing party to pay opponent's attorney's fees. The 
authorities cited in point IV above demonstrate that 
attorney's fees is not part of the special damages which 
can be alleged and proved in a slander of title action. 
The result is that the allowance of attorney's fees in 
this action (Finding 27, (B, 246); Conclusion of Law 4 
(B. 248); Judgment (E. 250) is invalid and without 
justification of law. 
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VI. 
WHETHER PUNITIVE DAMAGES ARE ALLOW-
ABLE IN THIS ACTION? 
Finding of Fact 26 (R. 246) reads as follows: 
"26. That defendant Dowse in all of said 
acts acted maliciously and with intent to vex and 
harass plaintiff. That said defendant S. W. 
Dowse knew that his not satisfying the judgment 
as herein referred to and in executing on and 
selling plaintiff's property would cast a cloud 
upon and slander upon plaintiff's title to all land 
owned or that might thereafter be owned by plain-
tiff, and the said defendant has been guilty of 
oppression and malice. That this is a proper case 
for punitive and exemplary damages. That the 
sum of $500.00 is a reasonable sum to be awarded 
plaintiff as punitive damages." 
The Judgment (R. 248) awarded Pender $500.00 
punitive and exemplary damages. 
Issue of Fact 10 in the Pretrial Order (R. 35) read 
as follows: 
"Did S. W. Dowse act maliciously in direct-
ing the sheriff to sell the real property under the 
execution herein and if he did what would be 
the amount of punitive damages to assess against 
S. W. Dowse in case Rennold Pender prevails in 
this law suit!" 
Allowance of punitive damages is discussed in the 
following excerpts from decided cases: 
"Exemplary, punitive, or vindictive damages 
are such damages as are in excess of the actual 
loss, and are allowed where a tort is aggravated 
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by evil motive, actual malice, deliberate violence, 
oppression or fraud." (Murphy v. Booth, 36 Utah 
285; 103 Pac. 768). 
"The law does not, and in the nature of things 
cannot, allow exemplary or punitive damages 
for mere negligence, although gross, nor for mis-
takes that may affect the rights of others, unless 
some act or acts indicative of bad motives or an 
intention to oppress or wrongfully vex and harass 
another is made manifest. Actual and compen-
satory damages is the rule, and exemplary or 
punitive damages the exception." (Rugg v. Tol-
man, 39 Utah 295,117 Pac. 54). 
"Whether there is evidence justifying exem-
plary damages is a question of law for the court, 
and, where there is no evidence, it is error to sub-
mit the issue to the jury." (Tripp v. Bagley, 75 
Utah 42, 282 Pac. 1026; Cf. Haycraft v. Adams, 
82 Utah 347, 24 Pac, (2d) 1110). 
"In the second place, what is known as malice 
in fact, as distinguished from malice in law, must 
exist before punitive or exemplary damages can 
be given. Appellants quote the definition of 
malice as 'legal malice, or the malice aforethought 
of the statute, denotes a wrongful act done inten-
tionally, and without legal cause or excuse.' Peo-
ple v. Taylor, 36 Cal. 255. In other words, appel-
lants contend that malice in a legal sense simply 
means a wrongful act done intentionally, without 
just cause or excuse. This is true so far as sup-
porting an award of compensatory damages Ls 
concerned, but malice in fact goes to the state of 
mind and evil motive of defendant, and the burden 
to proving the existence of that state of mind 
is in every case upon the plaintiff who seeks an 
award of punitive damages based upon its exist -
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ence, and whether this state of mind existed is 
always a question for the court or jury to deter-
mine. Taylor v. Hearst, 107 Cal. 262, 40 P. 392; 
Trabing v. California Navigation Co., 121 Cal. 
137, 53 P. 644; Davis v. Hearst, 160 Cal. 143, 116 
P. 530." {Boss v. Sweeters, 119 Cal. App. 716, 7 
Pac. (2d) 234). 
In order to sustain this allowance of exemplary 
damages there must be preponderating evidence that 
Dowse acted maliciously and vindictively in causing the 
writ of execution to issue and the sale to be held there-
under. This malice must be malice in fact and not malice 
in law. There must be evidence to show that Dowse 
was motivated by a malicious desire to injure Pender 
and not simply to vindicate his (Dowse's) rights. The 
Murphy case, supra, illustrates graphically what is meant 
by malice in fact. Booth used criminal processes in 
attempting to collect a debt pretending that Mrs. Murphy 
had fraudulently contracted the obligation. It was mani-
fest from Booth's actions and expressions that he sought 
to punish and humiliate Mrs. Murphy so as to compel 
her to pay a debt which she denied existed. The Rugg 
case, supra, illustrates that mere negligence or mistake 
although gross is not sufficient to support punitive dam-
ages unless there is evidence of bad motives or intention 
to oppress or wrongfully vex or harass another without 
legal justification. 
The record in the instant case must therefore be 
searched to discover malice in fact on the part of Dowse 
in order to support exemplary damages. It is confidently 
asserted that the evidence herein is totally lacking in 
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proof of such fact. Dowse held a money judgment against 
Pender. He pursued his legal remedy by causing writ 
of execution to issue on said judgment. There is no 
requirement of law that prohibited Dowse from adopt-
ing this legal process to collect the judgment owing 
him. It was authorized by law. He had paid Pender 
$100.00 in order to secure Pender's waiver of time to 
appeal. Neither Pender himself nor his attorney Back-
man as a condition for waiving the time of appeal 
exacted from Dowse a satisfaction of the judgment. 
The record shows that the judgment was ignored by 
Pender in requiring Dowse to pay for the appeal waiver. 
With this status of the transaction Dowse simply pur-
sued a remedy granted him by law. There is no evidence 
that he threatened Pender or expressed the desire of 
punishing him. There is not a line of evidence to indi-
cate that Dowse entertained personal animus against 
Pender. Under these circumstances there is a total 
absence of malice in fact in Dowse's actions. Finding 
of Fact 26 and the provisions of the judgment based 
on the same should be nullified. 
STABILITY OF LAND TITLES DERIVED THROUGH 
JUDICIAL PROCESS 
The stability and marketability of real property 
titles is a matter of grave concern to the courts. Any 
rule which would permit a judgment debtor to upset a 
sheriff's sale after the period of redemption has expired 
and the sheriff's deed issued to the purchaser by institut-
ing an independent action collaterally attacking the sale 
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and asking for cancellation of the deed on the grounds 
herein asserted would be highly destructive of land titles 
derived through judicial process. It is manifest from a 
study of the decisions of the courts of the several states 
that they are well aware of the chaotic condition as to 
real property titles which would result as a consequence 
of permitting a dissatisfied judgment debtor successfully 
to impeach and nullify sheriff's sales on the grounds 
here urged. Public policy very definitely dictates that 
the integrity of such sales be upheld and that irregular-
ities of the nature here discussed be disallowed in a col-
lateral action as grounds for nullifying such sale and 
the conveyance issued pursuant thereto. A judgment 
debtor is not denied relief by this rule. In Utah he may 
directly question the validity of the sale by a motion filed 
at any time during the period of redemption. Title to 
the real property does not pass upon the sale or by the 
issuance of the certificate of sale but only by the sheriff's 
deed at the expiration of the period of redemption. 
(Local Realty Company v. Lmdquist, et ux, 96 Utah 
297, 85 Pac. (2d) 770). During the period of redemption 
the purchaser at the sale or anyone dealing with the 
property is on notice that the sale is not final and that 
during such period the judgment debtor may question 
the regularity of the sale in all particulars. There is, 
therefore, no hardship visited upon a judgment debtor. 
It certainly does not lie in his mouth to say that he did 
not know there was a judgment against him and further 
he is charged with the knowledge that an execution may 
issue on such judgment to satisfy the same. It is his 
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responsibility to keep himself informed as to the issu-
ance of a writ of execution and any sale held thereunder. 
When he stands by during the whole period of redemp-
tion and fails to question the procedure on sale and 
allows the sheriff's deed to issue he has certainly waived 
all objections to those irregularities which produce void-
able conditions only. He should be absolutely forbidden 
to attack the processes of sale on the grounds here urged 
after he has waited until after the sheriff's deed has 
issued to the purchaser. Any other rule would render 
titles on judicial sales infirm and rather shadowy affairs. 
The purchaser or mortgagee dealing with such titles 
would be charged at his peril to ascertain facts which 
might and usually would be difficult, if not impossible 
of discovery. The economic and social well-being of the 
state dictates that the titles produced by such sales 
should be sustained against such attacks. 
WHEREFORE, Dowse prays that the judgment in 
this action be reversed and set aside and the trial court 
be directed to enter judgment against Pender with costs 
in favor of Dowse. 
Respectfully submitted, 
L A M A R DUNCAN 
FRANKLIN RITER 
Attorneys for Defendant 
and Appellant 
S.W. DOWSE 
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